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JULY 1985	 NUMBER 4
THE MISGUIDED APPLICATION OF
TRADITIONAL FEE DOCTRINE TO THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACTt
JUNE CARBONE*
INTRODUCTION
Step by step, Congress and the courts have been moving away from the "American
rule" that each party in litigation must bear its own fees. Once the Supreme Court called
a halt to the expansion of common law fee awards in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,' Congress increased the tempo of statutory authorizations, selectively
extending lee availability to encourage litigation in areas deemed to be of special im-
portance, such as civil rights and environmental suits. 2 The Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA or Act), which permits litigants prevailing against the United States to recover
fees where the government position is not substantially justified, is the most recent and
far reaching extension of fee liability."
In interpreting this myriad of fee shifting laws, the courts have devoted considerable
attention to delineating fee eligibility, closely reviewing the legislative history to construe
the particular provisions of each statute. 4 Yet, under these same statutes, the courts have
tCopyright 1985 Boston College Law School.
*Assistant Professor, George Mason University; A.B., Princeton University, 1975; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1978. As a Department of Justice attorney, the author represented the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in Underwood v. Pierce, No. 79-1318 (C.D. Cal. 1983) and
Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Sum). 937 (D. Conn. 1983). The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Departments of Justice or Housing
and Urban Development.
The author wishes w thank Professor John Leubsdorf for his thoughtful comments on an
earlier draft of the article, colleagues at George Mason University School of Law for their support
and encouragement, and research assistants Robert Kates and Faith O'Malley for their help in
preparing the article for publication.
1 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2 See infra note 147.
3
 Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. 11,94 Stat. 2329 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(1982)).
See, e.g., Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S.
412 (1978); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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set fees under a "common law" 5
 formula more dependent on the ways fees were deter-
mined in the last type of award than on the dictates of the present ones The Supreme
Court is only now beginning to reconcile fee calculation with the statutory authorization
on which the awards must be based.?
The EAJA, even more than its fee shifting predecessors, requires that fee calculation
be treated as a matter of statutory construction. While other fee statutes have sought to
vindicate narrowly defined rights of special significance, the EAJA seeks to alter the
economic calculus underlying decisions to litigate. In order to enhance access' to the
courts and to deter government misconduct, Congress enacted a wholesale waiver of
sovereign immunity to permit the award of fees to any party prevailing against the
United States in a suit where the government position is not "substantially justified" and
where special circumstances do not make an award unjust. 8 At the same time, Congress
sought to limit the potential cost and chilling effect of such fees by imposing restraints
on the amount of fees and the manner in which they are to be calculated. 8 While most
fee shifting statutes provide for the award of "reasonable fees," the EAJA specifies that
fees are to be limited to "fees ... incurred by that party in any civil action,"" that they
be calculated in accordance with "prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the
services furnished,"" and that "fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour
unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such
as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a
higher fee." 12 Thus, under the EAJA, fee calculation as well as fee availability is central
to accomplishment of the Act's objectives.
Despite the EAJA's distinctive provisions governing fee calculation, the courts have
more often looked to non-EAJA precedents to set fees than to the statutory guidelines."
Under most other fee shifting statutes, the courts multiply time spent by prevailing
hourly rates and then adjust the result, by a factor as high as four, to compensate for
factors such as risk or quality. 1 4 The EAJA, however, insists on the award of prevailing
market rates not to exceed $75 per hour." Even under the statutory exception which
allows courts to award higher hourly rates in certain instances, no recognition of non-
market factors such as quality is permitted. Moreover, awards enhanced to reward risk
conflict with congressional intent to accord the highest priority to the most egregious
The formula originates with common law cases, but it is also a "common law" formula in the
sense that it is a judicially created doctrine which has evolved on a case by case basis.
6 In true common law cases, the courts shifted fees among the beneficiaries of a common fund
in accordance with the guidelines for private attorney-client disputes. See infra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text. In later cases, the appellate courts expanded the common fund awards to
parallel contingent fee arrangements, then curtailed them as class action recoveries multiplied the
fees out of proportion to the legal effort. See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text. Statutory
cases used the formula intended to restrain common fund fees to expand civil rights and environ-
mental awards. See infra note 79.
See infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
9 See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. See also Section II passim.
10 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
" 28 U.S.C. § 24 I2(d)(2)(A) (1982).
12 28 U.S.C. § 24I2(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
"See infra text accompanying notes 179-97.
14 See infra notes 63-67,70-73,91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes II and 12.
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government action.' 6
 The wholesale incorporation of traditional fee standards into the
EAJA thus violates express statutory provisions, threatening the EAJA's balance between
fee incentives and fee restraint and diluting the statutory priorities established by Con-
gress.
This article examines EAJA fee calculation against the background of the evolving
"common law" formula for fees. The first section of the article traces the origins of
existing doctrine and documents the course of judicial expansion and restraint as the
courts have adapted traditional methods of fee calculation to serve new types of awards.
The article then reviews the legislative history of the EAJA, setting forth the statute's
provisions and purposes and evaluating their implications for fee calculation. To dem-
onstrate the conflicting statutory constructions which traditional doctrine dictates, the
third section of the article compares two recent EAJA cases which run the gamut of fee
calculation issues. Finally, the article argues that the courts should carefully limit appli-
cation of section 2412(b) of the Act, a relatively narrow section stating only that the
"United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any
other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute
which specifically provides for such an award." 17 The article concludes that the calculation
of EAJA fees — like that of all statutory awards — is a matter of statutory construction.
Congress has found reason to depart from the American rule that each party must bear
its own fees in an increasing number of areas, but the reasons are not identical. The size
of fee awards as well as their availability should be tailored to advance the particular
purposes they were intended to serve. There is no place for a common law of fee
calculation obliterating statutory distinctions.
I. THE EVOLVING "COMMON LAW" OF FEE CALCULATION
The rational study of attorneys' fee calculation, like the rational study of the rest of
the common law, is the study of history." To understand the fees now being awarded
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, one must look to statutory civil rights determi-
nations. To explain the civil rights awards, one must examine common fund fees in
complex class actions. To justify the common fund awards, one must evaluate contingent
fee recoveries. To understand these awards, one must begin with judicial resolution of
private attorney-client disputes.
In examining the judicial resolution of private fee disputes, the remarkable thing is
that the actual cost to the client — the starting point for determining court costs, medical
16 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1982). See also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
18 In the words of Justice Holmes:
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must
be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules
which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first
step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of
the worth of those rules It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it is laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 421, 428 (Morris ed.
1959).
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fees, and most other compensable expensesI 9 — has never been the primary focus of
judicial calculation of attorneys' fees. Historical accident supplies at least part of the
reason: 29 the first occasions for judicial fee calculation were to supply terms missing from
the attorney-client agreement, 21 cases in which the clients, by definition, had incurred
no fixed expenses before the court award.22 Judging from the reported opinions, legal
representation could be secured with agreement only that such representation would be
provided. The fee — indeed, the method by which the fee was to be calculated — could
be left for later resolution, if not by the parties, then by the courts." The judicial
determination of quantum meruit, in principle no different from the determination of
the compensation due any other employee, established guidelines for "reasonable fees"
in the profession generally.'" The courts in these cases typically listed the considerations
deemed appropriate, and then struggled to balance the result of the attorney's endeavors
against the services rendered and the lawyer's professional standing." The New York
Court of Appeals in Randall v. Packard explained:
"Cf., e.g., Winkleman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 511-14 (S.D.N,Y. 1942) (the
assessment of accountants' fees on a time spent basis), off 'd per curiam sub nom. Singer v. General
Motors Corp., 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Breger, The English System of Reimbursing Costs,
47 L. & CoN•sti-. PROBS. 249, 250 n.12 (1984).
24 See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, R7 HARV. L. REV. 1597,
1607-08 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 1]; Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV, L. REV. 849, 862 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients II]. Professor Dawson also suggests that judicial
sympathy for the income of the bar may be part of the explanation. But see Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients I, supra, at 1600, noting that the articulated purpose of most fee shifting legislation
is to hold the client harmless, not benefit the lawyer.
21 See infra note 23.
22 Indeed, in many attorney-client disputes, the only issue for resolution was the amount of the
fee. See, e.g., Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y. 47, 36 N.E. 823 (1894). Further, in common fund cases,
the benefiting nonclient necessarily had no contractual relationship with the attorney. See generally
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients I & II, supra note 20.
" See, e.g., Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876) (amount of compensation not fixed); Taylor
v. Scarborough, 66 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1933) (defendant retained plaintiffs as counsel without
discussion of fees); Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 37 F.2d 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (attorneys
discharged during case, amount of compensation not fixed); In re Rude, 101 F. 805, 807 (1). Ky.
1900) (where there was no express contract between attorney and client, attorney was only entitled
to a reasonable compensation under an implied contract); Leitensdorfer v. King, 7 Colo. 436, 4 P.
37 (1884) (agreement that compensation should be for the reasonable value of services rendered);
Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335 (1824) (plaintiff attorney represented destitute defendant without
prior fee arrangement); Smith v. Couch, 117 Mo. App. 267, 92 S.W. 1143 (1906) (attorney retained
at such compensation as his services should be reasonably worth); Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y. 47,
36 N.E. 823 (1894) (dispute as to agreement for compensation).
24 See, e.g., Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335 (1824), brought as an action in indebitatus assumpsii
for quantum meruit. See also Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery,
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 15-16 n.45 (1984) (cases cited therein) [hereinafter cited as Leubsdorf,
American Rule]. Cf. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907) (doctors); Vickery v.
Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909) (construction contractor). Professor Leubsdorf also
documents the practice during the colonial period and the early years after independence, when
legislatures regulated the amount of fees lawyers could collect both from their clients and from a
defeated adversary. Leubsdorf, American Rule, supra, at 10-17.
" See Leitensdorfer v. King, 7 Colo. 436, 442, 4 P. 37, 40-41 (1884). The court stated:
In estimating the value of an attorney's services where no special contract exists fixing
the same, they are to consider a variety of facts and circumstances, such as the character
of the litigation in which the services were rendered; the novelty, difficulty and im-
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The general rule is that an attorney, in the absence of an agreement, deserves
compensation according to the reasonable worth of his services. Of that the
jury are the sole judges and, to arrive at their value, they may consider the
nature of the services rendered, the standing of the attorney in his profession
for learning, skill and proficiency, the amount involved and the importance
to his client of the result. The reason why the result is one of the important
factors in the consideration must be obvious. It not only is some evidence of
the usefulness of the services; but, for its effects upon the situation of the
client, relative to what it had been, it must be conceded a degree of influence,
in fixing the amount of the attorney's compensation proportioned to the
nature and incidents of the result, in connection with the other considerations
adverted to. 26
While later courts warned against undue reliance on the result, 27
 most courts continued
to insist that reasonable fees could not be based solely on time spent. 28 The majority
portance of the questions involved; the value of the rights or property in controversy;
the attorney's position in the case, as leading or assistant counsel, and the degree of
responsibility resting upon him; the length of time necessarily consumed by the trial
and other court proceedings; the fact, if it be a fact, that compensation is wholly
contingent upon success; the manner in which his duties are performed, etc.
Id, See also Taylor v. Scarborough, 66 F.2d 589, 591 (2d Cir. 1933) ("No doubt the value of the
result attained is one of the elements to be considered. Other elements are the complexity of the
problems and the amount of time devoted to them."); Campbell v. Goddard, 17 III. App. 385, 385
(1885) ("In determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee, regard must be had to the amount
involved as well as to the labor and skill required to perform the services charged for ...."); Holly
Springs v. Manning & Watson, 55 Miss, 380, 388 (1877) ("What sum that should be is determinable
by the importance of the contest, the labor and responsibility of counsel, and every circumstance
attending the cause which, according to established usage, serves to guide to a conclusion as to what
is a proper professional charge in such a state of circumstances."); O'Neill v. Crane, 65 A.D. 358,
360, 72 N.Y.S. 812, 813 (1901) (nature and importance of litigation, the standing of the attorney
in his profession for "learning, skill and proficiency," and the importance to the client of the result).
'' 142 N.Y. 47, 56, 36 N.E. 823, 824 (1894). The court further counseled that although the
result is:
unquestionably . . . very important, ... Itlhere are several other elements, which must
be equally considered in determining the amount of ass attorney's compensation, and
unless the jury were instructed as'to the importance of their consideration; or if they
were so instructed, concerning the importance of the result attained for the client, as
to mislead them into the belief that they were at liberty to base their estimate entirely,
or principally, upon that result, there would have been distinct error."
Id. The other factors the court mentioned included "the nature of the services rendered, the
standing of the attorney in his profession for learning, skill and proficiency [and] the amount
involved ... ." Id.
27 See Taylor v. Scarborough, 66 F.2d 589, 591 (2d Cir. 1933) (court of appeals reversed lower
court decision, finding that the fee awarded below was excessive because it equalled one third of
total award, emphasizing that result alone should not determine amount of fees); In re Rude, 101
F. 805, 807 (D. Ky. 1900); Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335, 342 (1824) ("The enquiry under a
quantum merlin is not, what benefits, immediate and remote, have been derived from the services
.... But the question is what is the general worth of certain services rendered or goods sold."). See
also Leubsdorl, American Rule, supra note '24, at '23 n.98 (practice of jury determinations of lawyers'
suits against their clients).
22 See Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 37 F.2d 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). The court stated:
The value of a lawyer's services is not measured by time or labor merely. The practice
of law is an art in which success depends as much as in any other art on the application
of imagination — and sometimes inspiration — to the subject matter In order,
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agreed that the result provided a primary measure of the value of the attorneys' service
to the client reasoning that a reasonable person would not incur fees exceeding a
reasonable proportion of the amount in controversy. 29
The increasing use of contingent fees in private fee arrangements formalized reli-
ance in the legal profession generally on the result as an appropriate measure of legal
fees." Barred in the early days of the republic as champertous, 31 contingent fees became
increasingly popular by the turn of the century as a way of securing representation for
those whose greatest asset might be their legal claim." In some areas of practice, per-
centage of recovery awards became the standard fee measure, although the courts
remained wary of imposing contingent fees involuntarily." Nonetheless, the widespread
therefore, accurately to chancer the value of the lawyer's services, one must almost
always examine them in light of the event.
Id. at 750. In Smith v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 60 Iowa 515, 522-23 (1883), the court stated:
While the labor of an attorney in conducting a case wherein great values are involved
may be no greater than would be required in a case of trifling importance, yet the
responsibility would be greater .... In cases of great magnitude, not only is the
responsibility greater, but the resistance is always more formidable .... We are au-
thorized to say that under the general custom of the profession, values in controversy
always control charges for professional services.
Id. at 522-23. See Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N.Y. 438, 441 (1873) ("It surely was material, to show
the nature and importance of the controversy, and what results hung upon it in other matters, and
how other matters affected it and increased its gravity."). See also Lombard v. Bayard, 15 F. Gas.
791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1848) (No. 8,469), aff , Bayard v. Lombard, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 530 (1850); Adair
Lumber Co. v. Atchison, 'F. & S.F. Ry. Co., 19 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1937); Succession of Roth,
33 La. Ann. 540, 542 (1881); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 337 (1889).
29 Even in those cases where the courts admonished against undue reliance on the result, they
limited their approvals to fees that did not constitute an undue percentage of the clients' recovery.
See Taylor v. Scarborough, 66 F.2d at 591 (approving one-third award); Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y.
at 57, 36 N.E. at 824 (the trial court instructed the jury that "[u]ndoubtedly a lawyer — and every
lawyer is governed by that consideration — will not charge a client as much if the client be
unsuccessful"). See also City of New Orleans v. Malone, 12 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1926); Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924); Campbell v. Goddard, 17 III. App. 385 (1885);
Standard Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Excelsior Refining Co., 108 La. 74, 32 So. 221 (1902); Rutland v.
Cobb, 32 La. Ann. 857, 859 (1880) (considering "the amount involved and ultimately realized by
the plaintiffs, and to some extent appreciating the fee proportionally to the amount recovered or
received by plaintiffs").
3° Contingent fees classically involve a lawyer-client agreement that the attorney will receive a
fee only if successful, and that the legal fee will consist of a fixed percentage of the client's recovery.
A fee can be "contingent," however, in the sense that the lawyer will receive no compensation if
unsuccessful, or even in the sense that the lawyer undertook a case without assurance of payment,
without necessarily implying that payment must be a percentage of the recovery. E. WEEKS, A
TREATISE OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW 721 (2d ed. 1892). In this article, references to
"contingent fees" will refer to classical percentage contingent arrangements unless noted otherwise.
See Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335 (1824); Walbridge v. Barrett, 118 Mich. 433, 76 N.W.
973 (1898); O'Neill v. Crane, 65 A.D. 358, 72 N.Y.S. 812 (1901); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor
in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 475 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factor]; E. WEE;xs, supra note 30, at 716-20,
12 See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 476; Leubsdorf, American Rule, supra
note 24, at 16 & nn.46-48; E. WEEKS, supra note 30, at 716-18, 720.
" In Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876), the parties had agreed that the attorney would
not be paid unless successful, but were silent on the amount. The Court, noting that "the amount
of compensation to he paid was not fixed," ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to introduce testimony
from other attorneys in order to prove "what is ordinarily charged in such cases ...." Id. at 557.
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use of contingent fee agreements increased the profession's use of percentage of recovery
calculations even in noncontingent cases and introduced a new concept to private fee
agreements — premium for risk."
This contingent fee model found fertile ground with the expanded availability of
common fund fee awards." The seminal common fund fee award case, Trustees v.
Greenough, 56 involved a straightforward claim by the client for reimbursement from the
fund for the legal fees he incurred in eleven years of litigation involving misuse of over
ten million acres of land and resulting in substantial payments to his fellow bondholders.
The Supreme Court ruled for the client, noting that if the trustees themselves had
incurred the expenses in retrieving the assets for the trust, the expenses would have
been recoverable. To deny the client reimbursement, the Court explained:
would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the other parties
entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage. He
has worked for them as well as for himself; ... they ought to contribute
their due proportion of the expenses which he has fairly incurred. To make
them a charge upon the fund is the most equitable way of securing such
contribution."
The Court's ruling in Greenough thus introduced a new type of fee award, one that
shifted fee liability to nonclient beneficiaries by deducting a portion of their benefits.
Three years later, in Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, the Supreme Court
expanded Greenough to permit attorneys who had already been fully paid by their clients
to recover additional fees from the benefits flowing to nonclient class members." The
Pettus attorneys claimed that they had always intended to charge fees to all parties who
took advantage of the decree; otherwise they would have charged their own clients
Testimony established that the usual fee was 20-25% of the award and the Court upheld a jury .
verdict of $9,185.18 on a recovery of $45,925.01. Id. at 553. But see E. WEEKS, supra note 30, which
states:
But the law never implies, from the rendition of services by an attorney, a promise to
pay what is known as a "contingent fee," — and such a promise, if it exist at all, is the
creation of an express contract. And in an action upon a quantum meruit, to recover
for services rendered by an attorney, evidence of other attorneys as to what would be
reasonable contingent fee is inadmissible. (Ellis a. Woodburn, 89 Col. 129 [sicl).
See also Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. v. McAdams, 88 Ark. 550, 115 S.W. 175 (1908) (declining to
include contingent award in assessing fees against insurance company); Southland Life Ins. Co. v.
Norton, 5 S.W.2d 767 (Tx. 1928).
" Cf infra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text (concept of premium for risk developed in the
common fund context).
" "Common fund" awards are fee awards assessed against a fund recovered in litigation as a
way of redistributing legal fees to nonclients who have benefited from the fund without otherwise
incurring the legal expenses necessary to create the fund. Professor Dawson discusses the means
of creating such funds, see Dawson, [Augers and Involuntary Clients I, supra note 20, at 1612-36, and
analogous suits, such as stockholders derivative actions, see generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients II, supra note 20. He has also ably documented the legal profession's enthusiastic embrace
of an attorney's right — independent from his client's — to recover a share of nonclient beneficiaries'
benefits. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients I, supra note 20, at 1607; Dawson, Lauryets and
Involuntary Clients II, .supra note 20, at 851.
'" 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
Id. at 532.
a Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Penns, 1 13 U.S. 116 (1885).
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more." The Supreme Court found that the lack of assent from either the client or
nonclients did not bar attorneys' fees, stating that "every ground of justice" required
payment for those who "accepted the fruits of the labors of" others. 1" The Pettus decision
opened the door to further expansion of common fund awards. Under Greenough, the
measure of fees was that which the original client had agreed to pay limited by the
amount in the fund."' After Pettus, prevailing attorneys could claim a share of the
nonclients' profits with no contractual guidance as to the amount."' The result was to
subject common fund fees to the same quantum meruit determinations applicable to
other fee awards.
In determining common fund awards, the courts initially followed the standards
devised for voluntary clients."' They listed the applicable factors, balancing the time
39 id. at 125. See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 1, supra note 20, at 1603.
0
 113 U.S. at 127.
4 ' Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 11, supra note 20, at 851.
4' Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients I, supraPr  note 20, at 1608.
The widespread use of contingent fees in litigation of [this type) ... has not only
accustomed lawyers to this notion of profit sharing but helps to explain why Greenough-
type applications by clients for contribution have been so rare. The Greenough mech-
anism cannot operate until the client's liability to his lawyer has been determined. If
a claim is made that nonclient beneficiaries of the litigation should contribute to its
cost, the amount to be charged to them, through a charge on the fund or otherwise,
will clearly have to he determined by the court. The valuation process will then be
pushed back one stage, to determine what fee could reasonably he charged by the
lawyer for conducting the litigation to its ultimate success. This becomes indistinguish-
able from the court's decision whether the client can fairly ask the beneficiaries for
contribution in that amount. Two mental processes thus coalesce into one . [with[
the conclusion ... that when a lawyer has agreed on a gamble with his own client by
contracting with his client for a contingent fee, he has thereby bought a share in the
winnings of strangers.
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 11, supra note 20, at 852-53. Professor Dawson writes that
such a conclusion shows the misdirection of such reasoning since the lawyer's share in the benefits
that the litigation has produced for nonclients is ''not a cost to be spread, it is irrelevant and should
he excluded, whether the lawyer served on a retainer with a fixed fee or a contingent fee agreed
to by his client." Id. at 852.
43 See, e.g., Blackhurst v. Johnson, 72 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1934) (trust) (considering "the
character, ability and experience of the attorneys, the amount involved, the time necessary to
prepare for trial, the difficulties and intricacies of the propositions involved, and the results ob-
tained"); City of New Orleans v. Malone, 12 F.2t1 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1926) (corporate receivership)
(court considered "the amount realized, as well as the labor and skill needed or expended"); Graham
v. Dubuque Specialty Machine Works, 138 Iowa 456, 463, 114 N.W. 619, 622 (1908) (considering
"time necessarily employed in and the success of the litigation; the amount of values involved; and
recovered; the ability, learning, and experience of the attorney, and his standing in the profession"
(citations omitted)); Standard Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Excelsior Refining Co., 108 La. 74, 77, 32 So.
221, 222 (1902) (bankruptcy) ("While the evidence shows that valuable services were rendered by
eminent counsel, involving much labor and time, there must, in insolvent estates, he taken into
consideration, in estimating fees, the practical results achieved in the way of moneys realized for
creditors, and care is always to be had not too greatly to deplete by charges the small store of funds
constituting the common stock out of which all a re to be paid."); Becht v. Miller, 279 Mich. 629,
640, 273 N.W. 294, 298 (1937) (considering "time spent, the amount involved, the character of the
services rendered, the skill and experience called for in the performance of the work, and the
results obtained"); Forrester & MacCinness v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining
Co., 29 Mont. 397, 409, 74 P. 1088, 1093 (1904) (considering "the amount and character of the
services rendered, the labor, time and trouble involved, the character and importance of the
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spent against the amount in controversy, with the result, measured by the amount of
the fund, 44 as the ultimate test of the reasonableness of the fee award.45 With the growing
reliance on contingent fees, however, particularly in the type of actions most likely to
result in common fund awards, successful lawyers sought to be awarded a percentage
of recovery fees commensurate with the one-quarter to one-third payments they were
receiving from their clients. 46 As Professor Dawson has astutely identified, the "bridge
... across the wide gulf between contingent fees based on consent, and those imposed
without consent by court order" was constructed by the decisions of Judge Woolsey of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York during the
1930's.47
In the seminal case of In re Osofsky,48 Judge Woolsey considered the compensation
due attorneys employed by a bankruptcy trustee with no fixed compensation. The lawyers
litigation in which the services were rendered, the amount of money or the value of the property
to be affected, the professional skill and experience called for, the character and standing in their
profession of the attorneys. * * * The result secured by the service of the attorneys may be considered
as an important element in determining their value."). See also Lombard v, Bayard, 15 F. Cas. 791
(E.D. Pa. 1848) (No. 8,469), aff 'd, Bayard v. Lombard, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 528 (1850). Cf similar
standards applied to determine statutorily authorized fees, Universal Film Manufacturing Co. v.
Copperman, 218 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1914) (copyright case, inquiring into "not only into the
extent of professional labor known to the court, but the importance of the litigation, both as to the
principle involved and the pecuniary magnitude of the case"); Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1931) (Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 40) (considering the amount involved, for that measures
the attorney's responsibility, the amount of work necessary, the amount of work done, the skill
used,,and the result"); Adair Lumber Co. v. Atchison, 'I'. & S.F. Ry, Co., 19 F. Stipp. 415, 417 (W.D.
Mo. 1937) (fee authorized by 49 U.S.C. § 16; "[Ole compensation of a lawyer cannot he fixed
necessarily by the time he was actually engaged." 'Fhe court also considered "the importance of the
case, ... the results, ... the skill, experience, and professional standing of the attorney, together
with the amount and nature of his professional business," and awarded a fee equal to 25% of the
recovery).
44 Professor Dawson concluded that there was no "clear evidence that among all the variables
to be considered the benefits conferred on nonclient strangers supplied the principal measuring
rod." Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients II, supra note 20, at 871 & n.79. The result, however,
was routinely considered and often determined to be of major importance as the test of value to
the client, see supra notes 25, 28 and 43. Of course, Dawson is correct that so long as the courts
simply listed the relevant factors and then the final amount, it is impossible to determine what
weight the courts gave to any single factor. The only evidence is the special emphasis given to the
result in a few, not necessarily representative cases. See, e.g., Marlin v. Marsh & Marsh, 189 Ark.
1157, 76 S.W.2d 965 (1935); Standard Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Excelsior Refining Co., 108 La. 74,
32 So. 221 (1902); Forrester & MacGinness v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining
Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 P. 1088 (1904).
4 ' The courts in early common fund cases refused, however, to impose a client's contingent fee
agreement on benefiting nonclients. See, e.g., McCartney v. Guardian Trust Co., 280 F. 64, 71 (8th
Cir. 1922) (stockholders' derivative action) ("the fee allowed claimant should not be estimated upon
a contingent basis"); Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Machine Works, 138 Iowa 456, 460, 114 N.W.
619, 621 (1908) (stockholders' derivative action) (stockholders had no right to enter into contingent
fee contract on behalf of corporation); Becht v. Miller, 279 Mich. 629, 634-41, 273 N.W. 294, 296-
99 (1937) (common fund, recovery of funds for estate). But see Trautz v. Lemp, 334 Mo. 1085,
1098, 72 S.W.2d 104, 110 (1934) (common fund, recovery of funds for trust, considering contin-
gency of recovery).
46 See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients I, supra note 20, at 1608; Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients II, supra note 20, at 871.
" Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients II, supra note 20, at 871.
48 50 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
852	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:843
had successfully increased the assets of the estate while lowering the claims against it 4 9
The court began by listing the familiar factors in the attorneys' fee analysis including
the time reasonably spent, the skill demanded and employed, the amount in controversy
and the result of the case. 9° Judge Woolsey, however, then went on to explain that in
bankruptcy cases such as the one at issue, "the quest for assets may be futile," and that:
[i[t is thus a question, as in salvage at sea, of no cure, no pay. When the
efforts of attorneys cause a material increase in the bankruptcy estate, or, as
here, created it, they should be well rewarded; otherwise there will not be
any incentive to attorneys to put forth their best efforts in cases which may
be unpromising.'
Judge Woolsey thus endorsed the premise underlying contingent recoveries, that lawyers
should be rewarded for risk — and extended it to clients who had never agreed to a
contingent fee arrangement.
Seven years later in Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., Judge Woolsey
applied the concept developed in Osofsky to stockholders' derivative actions, awarding a
fee of $200,000, or 22% of the recovery. Judge Woolsey reasoned that such awards
"should not be niggardly for appetite for effort in corporate therapeutics should, as in
salvage and bankruptcy cases, be encouraged." 92 Calculation of attorneys' fees as a
percentage of the recovery could hardly be described as novel; the Supreme Court had
endorsed such recoveries in common fund cases as early as 1885 in the Pettus case. 59
Judge Woolsey's analysis in Osofsky and Murphy, however, completed the transformation
of common fund fees to awards mirroring private contingent fee arrangements. 94
In employing a percentage of recovery calculation, 95 the courts did not abandon the
4'5 Id. at 927.
SG Id.
" Id. The court considered: (I) that which was fairly and properly to be used in dealing with
the case, because this represents the amount of work necessary; (2) the quality of skill which the
situation facing the attorney demanded; (3) the skill employed in meeting that situation; (4) the
amount involved, because that determines the risk of the client and the commensurate responsibility
of the lawyer; (5) the result of the case, because that determines the real benefit to the client; and
(6) the eminence of the lawyer at the bar, or in the specialty in which he may be practicing. Id.
Professor Dawson emphasizes Judge Woolsey's inclusion of the result, but the formulation is little
different from that in the many other cases discussed above. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients
II, supra note 20, at 872. See, e.g., Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y. 47, 56, 36 N.E. 823, 824 (1894). See
also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients I, supra note 20, at 1608-09.
52 Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
53 See Pettus, 113 U.S. at 128. See also cases cited in Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients II,
supra note 20, at 871 n.79.
54 See Cole, Counsel's Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions — Hornstein Revisited, 6 U.
RICH. L. REV. 259 (1972); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 11, supra note 20, at 876-78
(Dawson's critique of Hornstein); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 784, 814 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Hornstein, The Counsel Fee]; Hornstein, Problems
of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 574 (1942); Hornstein, Legal Thera-
peutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARI:. L. REV. 658, 660-61 (1956).
55 The same analysis employed in calculating common fund and stockholders' derivative award
was transferable to class actions, bankruptcies, trusts, decedents' estates and other cases involving
recovery of sizable funds. See, e.g., Angoff v. Goldflne, 270 I2.2d 185, 191 (1st Cir. 1959); In re
Detroit International Bridge Co., 111  F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1940) (corporate reorganization,
considering the extent and nature of the services; the labor, time and trouble involved; the results
achieved; the character and importance of the matter in hand; the value of the property or the
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lists of factors used as guidance in earlier cases. 58 Like Judge Woolsey, judges continued
to list considerations relevant to a determination of the particular percentage. They
simply added the "risk" or "contigent nature" of the recovery to the list. 57 The result in
large class actions, antitrust and securities litigation, and corporate reorganizations was
to justify enormous fee awards. 58 Moreover, the district courts entered these multimillion
dollar awards, expressed as percentages which varied from 2 1/2% to 49%, 59 with little
amount of money involved; the learning, skill and experience exercised; whether the fee is absolute
or contingent; and the ability to pay); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (emphasizing relation to benefit conferred); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (antitrust class action imposing 25%
contingent fee entered into by some members on entire class); Trautz v. Lemp, 334 Mo. 1085, 1098
(1934) (calculating fee for attorneys to trustee in accordance with contingency of recovery).
56 The courts also began to apply the same method in calculating statutorily authorized fees.
Congress had permitted fees in certain antitrust, copyright and insurance actions since the turn of
the century. The courts in these cases generally looked toward other fee determinations to determine
what was reasonable, with the early cases insisting on a reasonable sum for a competent attorney,
"not a speculative or contingent fee based upon the uncertainty of the result of the litigation."
Davilla v. Brunswick-Blake Callender Co. of New York, 94 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1938), modifying
19 F. Supp. 819, cert. denied, 304 U.S. 572 (1937) (copyright case, considering "the services necessarily
rendered and the success obtained" and reducing award from 40% to 20% of the result because
few issues were in dispute). See also Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791, 806 (2d Cir.
1924) (antitrust, considering "character of the services rendered, the time occupied and the result
obtained" and reducing fee on appeal because of reduction in amount of judgment); Universal
Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 F. 577, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1914) (copyright case); Adair Lumber
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 19 F. Supp. 415, 417 (W.D. Mo. 1937) (fee authorized by 49 U.S.C.
§ 16); Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. v. McAdams, 88 Ark. 550, 557, 115 S.W. 175, 178 (1908); Southland
Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 5 S.W.2d 767, 768-69 (Tx. 1928). Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111
Ark. 554, 571, 164 S.W. 720, 726 (1914) (considering amount sued for).
With emphasis on percentage recoveries to reward risk in other cases, the courts began to
adopt similar methods of calculation in determining statutorily authorized fees — at least in those
cases producing sizeable funds. Professor Dawson characterized as "[n*ire strange still," the
transfer of these methods of appraisal to antitrust treble damage actions, where fee
awards are authorized by the federal statute to be added to the liabilities of defendants.
15 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). Where damage recoveries (i.e. defendants' liabilities) are large,
percentage formulas are used for the evident purpose of increasing the fees awarded
On the other hand, where damage recovery for antitrust violations is low the
courts have taken as the base for calculation the reasonable value of time and effort
spent with the result that the fee often exceeds by a considerable margin the simple
damages recovered.
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients II, supra note 20, at 924 n.311.
57 See, e.g., Aitgoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959). The percentages also continued
to vary, from 111/2% to 45% according to Professor Hornstein in 1939, and from 2 1/2% to 49% in
1972. Cole, supra note 54, at 283-85; Hornstein, The Counsel Fee, supra note 54, at 814.
56 See, e.g., New York v. Darling-Delaware, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ($1,279,027);
Labbee v. Wm. Wrigley Jr., Co., 719 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-29 (W.D. Wash.
1975) ($4,348,706); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ($8,846,393); West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,749, 9 74,827 (S.D.N.Y.) and
Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ($10,406,984); Hartford
Hospital v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 974,112 (S.D.N.Y.) ($2,122,500);
Philadelphia v, International Pipe & Ceramics Corp,, No. 43,008 (L.D. Pa. June 30, 1971) (unpub-
lished opinion) ($1,250,000); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557
(F.D. Pa. 1969) ($5,443,750); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
9 61,887 ($3,963,173).
Cole, supra note 54, at 283-85. See also Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reason-
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explanation and minimal evidentiary review. Appellate courts reviewed the awards under
a deferential "abuse of discretion" standard, rarely overturning the awards and articu-
lating no satisfying criteria for review. 6°
In the mid-seventies, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Third
Circuits decided to call a halt to what they termed the "contingent fee syndrome." In
Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 61
the Third Circuit articulated a new fee formula in an action which produced a $26
million settlement fund. 62 Under this new formula the court first required a determi-
nation of how many hours the lawyers spent "in what manner by which attorneys." 63
Next, the court multiplied those hours by a reasonable rate of compensation for the
particular attorney and/or activity to form a "lodestar."" As the final step in the calcu-
lation, the court examined the contingent nature of success and the quality of represen-
tation. 6 ' Thus, in determining the amount of an award, the Lindy I court required the
productive hours spent to he multiplied by the reasonable rate of compensation 66
 and
able?", 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 288, & nn.34, 35 (1977) (citing percentages in antitrust cases varying
from 5 to 67%); Note, The Nature of a "Reasonable" Attorneys' Fee Private Antitrust Litigation, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. 102, 122 (concluding that "there is no indication that a rational development toward
an acceptable percentage has occurred, or that the later awards bear any relation to their prede-
cessors").
6° Berger, supra note 59, at 284 & n.12, 285 & n.17, 296-97. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[M]ore is needed than a mere listing of factors. Such a
list standing alone, can never provide meaningful guidance."); Lindy Bros. Mrs., Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1973) ("The mere listing of
four factors for consideration by the court makes meaningful review difficult and gives little
guidance to attorneys and claimants.").
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
62 Id. at 165 (citing Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Central R.R.
Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); and Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881)). The
court awarded attorneys' fees under the equitable fund doctrine. Id. The lower court had calculated
the fee award in accordance with the percentage of claimant's recovery awarded as attorneys' fees
in other cases, the amount of the recovery, the amount the attorneys received from their clients
and the time spent. Id. at 166 (citing 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1089-90 (F.D. Pa. 1972)). The lower court
had indicated that the percentage of a recovery awarded as fees should decline as the amount of
the recovery increased, and that time spent was less important in this case than in most cases. Id.
63 Id. at 167. The court stated that: "without some fairly definite information as to the hours
devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours
spent by various classes of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, associates, the court
cannot know the nature of the services for which compensation is sought." Id. Later courts, however,
have permitted lawyers to charge a single rate regardless of activities or staffing patterns, but they
often evaluate the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of such considerations. See, e.g.,
Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985), and Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1985), discussed infra notes 198-281 and accompanying text.
64
 487 F.2d at 167. The court indicated that:
Nhe value of an attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate. A
logical beginning in valuing an attorney's services is to fix a reasonable hourly rate for
his time — taking account of the attorney's legal reputation and status (partner,
associate) .... Similarly, the court may find that the reasonable rate of compensation
differs for different activities.
Id.
65 Id. at 168.
66 The court called this figure the "lodestar" and concluded that it "provides the only reasonably
objective basis for valuing an attorney's services." Id. at 167-68. In a later en banc hearing, the
Third Circuit emphasized that any adjustment to the lodestar "reflects exceptional services only; it
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the total then adjusted upward or downward to reflect the contingency and quality
factors. 67 The Third Circuit thus rejected a percentage of recovery analysis while still
permitting, indeed requiring, a premium to be paid for risk
Less than six months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit announced a similar ruling in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation.° Denouncing
undue reliance on the size of the recovery, the court of appeals reversed a $1.5 million
district court attorney fee award. 7° The court remanded the case, ordering the district
court to recalculate the fees to be awarded in accordance with the time spent,n appro-
priate hourly rate" and "risk of litigation."'" The Second Circuit defined the "risk of
litigation" as:
may be considered in the nature of a bonus or penalty." Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Lindy II). •
67 The court defined "the contingent nature of success" as a factor of "special significance
where, as here, the attorney has no private agreement that guarantees payment even if recovery is
obtained." The Lindy attorneys had contingent fee agreements. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. The court
then assessed the amount of the increase in terms of the probability of success in the litigation. Id.
In Lindy 11, the court defined "the contingent nature of success" in terms of "the probability or
likelihood of success, viewed at the time of filing suit;" and specified three elements of that
determination: I) analysis of the plaintiff's burden in the case; 2) the risks assumed in developing
the case, including the number of hours without guarantee of payment; and 3) delay in receipt of
payment. 540 F.2d at 117, See Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards Through Multipliers in Antitrust
Class Actions, 21 Hons. L. REV. 801, 839-40 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Adjusting Attorney
Fee Awards].
The Lindy 1 court defined the quality of attorney's work in terms of "the complexity and novelty
of the issues presented, the quality of the work the judge has been able to observe, and the amount
of the recovery obtained." 489 F.2d at 168. In the Lindy II proceeding, the court emphasized that
the "quality of an attorney's work in general is a component of the reasonable hourly rate." 540 F.2d
at 117 (emphasis in original). To avoid double counting, any increase or decrease must reflect "an
unusual degree of skill," "exceptional services only." Id. at 117-18; Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 168. In
Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit further defined
"quality" in terms of "the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the recovery obtained.
In settled cases, the ... [quality] factor is reflected largely in the benefit produced." Id. at 168.
Accord Lindy 11, 540 F.2d at 112.
68 In permitting consideration of the amount of the recovery in the assessment of quality,
however, the court appeared to do so in the older sense that degree of success reflected the efficiency
of the legal efforts, not the lawyer's share of the profits. See supra note 44. See also Ursic v. Bethlehem
Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Care must be exercised to assure that the statutory
purpose of encouraging access is not achieved at the price of a fee award so out of proportion to
the severity of the defendant's violation that it amounts to an excessively punitive sanction.").
62 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468 (2d Cir. 1974) (Grinnell I). See generally
White, Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Actions: Fee Applications in the Second Circuit, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv.
497 (1982).
7u The case involved three consolidated antitrust class actions resulting in a $10 million settle-
ment. 495 F.2d at 452.
II Id. at 470.
72 Id. at 471. 'Phe court stated: "Valuation obviously requires some fairly definite information
as to the way in which that time was spent (discovery, oral argument, negotiation, etc.) and by
whom (senior partners, junior partners or associates)." Id.
" Id. As in Lindy, the court multiplied "the number of hours that each lawyer worked on the
case by the hourly amount to which attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled for
a given type of work on the basis of an hourly rate of compensation" to determine the lodestar. Id.
The court then described the "risk of litigation" as the "foremost" among the "less objective factors"
which could be used to adjust the calculation, without identifying'any other factors. Id. In City of
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the fact that, despite the most vigorous and competent of efforts, success is
never guaranteed. The greater the probability of success, of either ultimate
victory on the merits or of settlement, the less the consideration should serve
to amplify the basic hourly fee. The tangible factors which comprise the "risk
of litigation" might be determined by asking the following questions: has a
relevant government action been instituted by others; and, are the issues
novel and complex or straightforward and weliworn? Thus determined, the
litigation risk factor might well be translated into mathematical terms. 74
The court adopted the Third Circuit formula of hours spent, while placing an even
greater emphasis on the risk of defeat. 75
The Lindy and Grinnell cases were designed to rationalize and restrain common fund
fees. Billing hours times hourly rates had long been an established practice within the
profession. 76 The multiplier prescribed by the courts offered the possibility of adjustment
for contingency and quality without overwhelming the "objective" part of the determi-
nation. The courts' insistence on evidentiary support and clearly articulated standards
preserved the opportunity for effective review." Moreover, by eschewing reliance on the
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (Grinnell II), the court stated that le]ven
when making allowance for such subjective factors such as the 'risk of litigation,' the courts must
he mindful that an attorney will receive an otherwise reasonable compensation for his time from
the lodestar figure alone." Id. at 1099.
74 495 F.2d at 471.
" The court in Grinnell I emphasized the risk of defeat, not the lawyer's risk of nonrecovery.
Id.; see supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1100 (rejecting "as
having no relevant precedential value cases involving contingent fees arranged by agreements with
clients; stockholders' derivative actions; and antitrust cases for which section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 § 815, expressly provides an award of counsel fees against the losing defendant."). Cf.
Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168 (formulation where the court defined the "contingent nature of success"
to be "of special significance where, as here, the attorney has no private agreement that guarantees
payment even if no recovery is obtained").
7" The three major models for attorneys' fees are: (1) fixed fees, e.g., a set fee of $40 for
drafting a simple will; (2) hourly rates for hours worked: and (3) contingent fees determined as a
percentage of the recovery. Steele 8: Rothe, Pricing Behavior of Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 14
FORUM 1060, 1066 (1979). Fixed fees are clearly inappropriate for the large, complex, risky and
unpredictable litigation most likely to generate common fund awards.
77 In Grinnell I, the court emphasized that:
[w]hen it sets a monetary value on a lawyer's services, the District Court must be in
possession of an enormous amount of information ... [, that] this information is ...
vital ... [Old, since resolution of disputed factual issues necessitates the hearing of
testimony ... , and is particularly facilitated by cross-examination ... [that] an eviden-
tiary hearing is required.
495 F.2d at 472. Accord Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 169-70. Similarly, the Second Circuit carefully reviewed
the second district court fee award in Grinnell II. In its decision, the court of appeals affirmed the
hourly rate awarded, reversed the allowance of any compensation for fee applications, and eliini-
nated the multipliers of' 2 and 3 applied. 560 F.2d at 1103. The result was to reduce the fee award
from $870,607.00 to $333,073.25. /d. The court reserved its strongest criticism for calculation of
the multiplier, noting that "the court offered only a brief, rather conclusory analysis of the efforts
of appellee in this litigation, constituting little more than the type of mere listing of factors which,
we pointed out in Grinnell L 'standing alone, can never provide meaningful guidance, — and con-
cluding that "the district court's opinion entirely fails to justify the vast increase with the express
factual findings and firm record support which Grinnell I requires." 560 F.2d at 1100. In practice,
however, evidentiary hearings remain rare, though the courts continue to insist on other forms of
documentation.
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result,78 the new formula adopted by the Second and Third Circuits tied compensation
to attorney time rather than the combination of claims."
For this formula to-effectively limit fee awards, however, appellate courts must be
unrelenting in their review of lower courts' awards., The Second and Third Circuits have
" The court in Grinnell II stated that: "[e]specially in class actions, judges determining fee
awards should not be unduly influenced by the monetary size of the class settlement or judgement;
a large settlement can as much reflect the number of potential class members or the scope of a
defendant's past acts as it can indicate the prestige, skill and vigor of class counsel." 560 F.2d at
1099. See also Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 471. Cf. supra note 68.
75 The major alternative analysis is the Fifth Circuit's list of unweighted factors set forth in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), requiring consid-
eration of (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved
and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and .ability of the attorneys, (10) the
"undesirability of the case," (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client, and (12) awards in similar cases.
The circuits split at first. Initially, the First Circuit mandated application of the Johnson factors
to civil rights cases, citing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. See
King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). But in Furtado
v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1980), the court adopted Lindy I in a prisoners' rights case as
"the most hopeful approach to date." The Eighth Circuit also embraced Lindy I in Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127 (8th Cir. 1975), but nonetheless continued to
apply Johnson in other cases. See, e.g., Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d
876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), reed
on the merits, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977) (class action). The D.C. Circuit
adopted a lodestar/multiplier analysis without specifically following either Lindy or Grinnell. See
National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane). The Fourth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits followed Johnson. See Johnson v. University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d
1205, 1207 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 249
(4th Cir. 1983); Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 1978);•Kerr v.
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). The
Seventh Circuit applied the standards set forth in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
Disciplinary Rule 2-106 in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309,
1322 (7th Cir. 1974), and Strama v. Peterson, 689 F.2d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1982). Cf. Everett
Plywood Corp. v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 705, 712 (1983). The Tenth Circuit issued inconsistent
opinions sometimes following Johnson and sometimes not. Compare Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp.
730 (D. Colo. 1982) (reviewing Tenth Circuit history), with Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1983) (setting forth current standard).
In 1980, the Sixth Circuit used the lodestar/multiplier analysis to apply the Johnson factors to
a school desegregation case. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 615 F.2d
624, 642-43 (6th Cir. 1980). In 1982, the Ninth Circuit adopted what it called a "blended" approach,
employing the Lindy lodestar analysis as "a procedure for ordering the examination of factors listed
in Johnson and adopted by the-Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc." Moore v. Matthews,
682 F.2d 830, 840 (9th Cir. 1982). The Eighth Circuit also embraced Johnson while applying those
factors in the lodestar/multiplier context. Jacquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 457-59
(8th Cir. 1983); Ladies Center, Nebraska, Inc. v. Thone, 645 F.2d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1981).
Since then, even the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the twelve Johnson factors may overlap,
concluding that the "existence of twelve items, varying in relevance and weight, some at odds with
others, imposes on a district judge the burden of clear articulation of the basis for his award of
fees." Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 1980). The result in
more recent cases has:been greater use of the lodestar analysis to order the Johnson factors, with
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insisted on separate8° - and modest - calculation of the contingency and quality
bonuses. 81
 The Second Circuit has monitored not only the size of the multipliers, but
reliance on reconstructed records, 82
 indiscriminate use of Wall Street rates in determining
community rates," and application of contingency increases to nonprofit organizations. 84
the Fifth Circuit now insisting on evidentiary hearings, adequate documentation and the "clear
articulation of the basis" for fee awards. Id.; Matter of First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d
1291, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts applying the Johnson factors continue to differ, however, in
defining which of the Johnson factors pertain to the multiplier. Compare Northcross v. Board of
Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 615 F.2d 624, 643 (6th Cir. 1980) (permitting adjustment for
"the contingency of the fee, unusual time limitations, and the 'undesirability' of the case"), with
Moore v. Matthews, 682 F.2d 830, 841 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the contingency and quality factors).
See generally Attorney's Fees in Class Actions, A Report to the Federal Judicial Center, at 74-184
(1980) (Professor Miller's 1980 review of the approaches taken by the different circuits).
8° In Lindy II, the Third Circuit reversed the district court determination on remand requiring
that "once the district court determines the 'lodestar' it should inquire separately into the contingency
and quality factors, and make specific findings of fact as to each." 540 F.2d at 117 (emphasis added).
See also National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1333 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1980); Grinnell
II, 560 F.2d at 1100.
8 ' See Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1978). In
Baughman, the district court had awarded a multiplier of 2.0 for contingency and 1.5 for quality.
The court of appeals reduced the former, recognizing that the risk of nonpayment and the
substantial delay in payment justified some increase, but emphasizing that the case was not legally
or factually complex, that damages were relatively easy to prove, and that, where the fees are a
substantial percentage of the recovery, increases for contingency should be minimal. Id. at 1218.
In reducing the multiplier for quality, the court emphasized that quality was a major component
in the determination of hourly rates and that increases to the lodestar are for "exceptional services
only." Id. See Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974) (Merola /); Merola v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975) (Merola II); see also Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
585 E2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 E2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Rodriquez v. Taylor,
569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
82
 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir.
1983). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983); National Ass'n of Concerned
Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Hughes v. Repko, the
Third Circuit further indicated that the hours the attorney claimed to work "should not be taken
at face value," but rather, that the district court should only consider those hours reasonably
supportive of and necessary to the prevailing claim. 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978).
" In New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1983),
the court of appeals held that "this recognition of equivalence between civil rights cases and other
complex cases does not necessarily imply equivalent fees for profit-making and nonprofit attorneys."
The Carey court concluded that the use of hourly Wall Street rates to compensate legal services
attorneys constituted "a large windfall that must be considered unreasonable" because legal services
organizations' costs and overhead are so much less than those of major corporate firms. To avoid
such windfalls, the court required lower courts:
to award fees to nonprofit law offices at billing rates of comparable attorneys in the
general run of cases as long as the billing rates are not so high that their use risks
significant windfalls, and to permit nonprofit law offices to receive fees calculated at
higher hourly rates only when such rates are justified to permit the offices to recover
their costs.
Id. Cf. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
" Carey, 711 F.2d at 1154. The court of appeals reduced the quality bonus from 25% to 10%,
finding 10% sufficient to recognize the "exemplary nature of the services rendered," and eliminated
the contingency bonus altogether, ruling that:
jallthough a component of a bonus for risk of failure may be appropriate in some
cases to entice private firms to undertake difficult cases in which victory is uncertain,
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The courts in both circuits have also continued to insist that the lower courts provide
detailed explanations of the bases for the fee awards, ordering further evidentiary
hearings where appropriate. 86 As a result, the appellate courts in these circuits have
almost never approved a multiplier above two, 86 while higher awards are not uncommon
in other circuits. 87
we believe that the promise of such rewards is not needed to induce nonprofit orga-
nizations like the Legal Aid Society and the Civil Liberties Union to take on such cases.
These organizations exist to represent groups like the Willowbrook class, with consti-
tutional claims at the cutting edge of the law. We join those courts that have found it
unreasonable to add contingency bonuses to fee awards for nonprofit law offices. See
McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38, 43 (W.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 616 F.2d 727 (4th
Cir. 1980); Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1978); McCormick v.
Attala County Bd. of Educ., 424 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
Carey, 711 F.2d at 1154.
as See, e.g., Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983) (vacating district court
award of 100% bonus for, inter alia, failure to make specific findings); Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of
Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1980) (whenever the district court augments or reduces
the lodestar figure, it must state its reasons for doing so "as specifically as possible"); Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting arbitrary percentage reduction and requiring
specific findings to support court's conclusion that hours were duplicative) (Prandini II); Hughes v.
Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Carey, 711 .F.2d at 1146 (permitting percentage
reductions in some cases).
' 6 See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984); Ursic v. Bethlehem
Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983) (vacating multiplier of 2); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussed supra notes 83-89); Baughman v. Wilson
Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1978) (contingency multiplier as high as 2 "most
unusual"); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1978); Beazer v. New York Transit Auth., 558
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (eliminating "premium" of
approximately 15% because legal issues relatively simple and few, despite complex factual issues,
and because benefits not concrete); Merola II, 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975); Institutionalized Juveniles
v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 568 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1983); WATCH v. Harris, 535 F. Supp.
9 (D. Conn. 1981); Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6 (D. Conn. 1980); Smith v. Fussenich,
487 F. Supp. 628 (D. Conn. 1980); Gagne v. Maher, 455 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd in
relevant part, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Firebird Soc'y v. Members of
the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 433 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1977);
Blank v. Talley, 390 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
but see Municipal Auth. of Bloomsburg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 527 F. Supp. 982 (M.D.
Pa. 1981) (award of multiplier of 4.5); In re Gas Meters Antitrust Litigations, C.A. MDL No. 360
(E.D. Pa. January 17, 1980) (award of multiplier of 2.57); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Fried v. Utilities Leasing Corp., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 95,695 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (award of multiplier of 4). These cases, however, do not appear to
have been reviewed by their respective circuits. Mowrey, Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Action and
Derivative Suits, 31 CORP. L. 267 (1978) (indicating that fees in securities cases declined after Lindy
and Grinnell). See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (award of 3.5 multiplier
to public interest attorneys challenging freeway project; case filed in February 1972, preliminary
injunction issued in July, 1972; contingency defined by absence of fee-paying client, length and
complexity of case, probability of success and probability of fee award); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn. 1978) (award of multiplier
of 3, antitrust class action settlement; multiplier justified principally by risk, and to a lesser degree,
by length of litigation, magnitude of recovery, quality of effort); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp.
959 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (award of multiplier of 3, antitrust class action settlement; list of seven Johnson,
Lindy and Grinnell factors; multiplier justified by need to encourage private antitrust enforcement,
complex litigation, contingency fee, magnitude of recovery); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago,
372 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. III. 1974) (award of multiplier of 4, antitrust class action settlement; fees
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At the same time that Lindy and Grinnell served to restrain common fund fees, the
decisions opened the door to expansion of the growing body of statutory awards." Civil
rights and environmental cases were often brought by altruistic attorneys seeking to
vindicate nonmonetary principles. Awards linked to a percentage of the recovery or to
the fees actually charged the client would result in nominal awards. 89 The Lindy-Grinnell
emphasis on prevailing market rates, enhanced to compensate for the common factors
examined "in light of the outstanding result achieved in this complex, multidistrict litigation which
was keenly contested"). Cf. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirms 10%
contingency bonus in complex class action involving seven years of protected litigation without
compensation; reverses 40% quality bonus because of overlap with quality factor in high hourly
rates awarded); Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982) {10% lodestar adjustment
based on findings that case was highly contingent, quality of work was excellent and significance of
results unusually impressive); Keyes v. School District No. I, Denver, Colo., 439 F. Supp. 393 (D.
Colo. 1977) (awarding no multiplier to public interest groups in case involving "complex, novel
issues," "extensive factual base," results of major importance, and considerable risk); Foster v. Boise,
Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. "Fx. 1976) (no award of multiplier, Title VII class action).
87 Other circuits have been less inclined to police the district court tendency to calculate hours,
hourly rates and multipliers through the time honored method of listing the appropriate factors
and announcing the result. See, e.g., Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402, 410-17
(E.D. Mo. 1983) (awarding multiplier of 33% based "upon the entire record in this case and in
particular the skills of plaintiff attorneys and the acknowledged expertise of counsel required for
the successful prosecution of this case, the results obtained on behalf of plaintiffs, the clear vindi-
cation of the public interest . . . , the contingent character of the compensation available, and the
thorough and diligent efforts made"); Willie M., By Singer v. Hunt, 564 F. Supp. 363 (W.D.N.C.
1983) (court reviewed each of the fohnson factors, then announced total award without explanation
of which factors contributed to the lodestar, which to the multiplier); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp.
403, 414 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (award of multiplier of 3.5 to reflect "the contingent nature of the case,"
the "quality of counsel's efforts," "the effect of delay" and "inflation" without any indication of what
portion of the multiplier was attributable to each factor); see also supra note 86 and cases cited
therein; Bertrand v. United States, 562 F. Supp. 222 (D. Or. 1983). Even where the listing of factors
involves detailed analysis, it can be impossible to determine which factors influenced which amounts.
Multipliers, inherently subjective under the strictest review, have varied from zero to four, without
clear or consistent definition of the bases for such increases.
The result in these circuits is fee awards as unpredictable and as resistant to effective review
as the percentage of recovery awards Lindy and Grinnell attempted to replace. See Northcross v.
Board of Educ. of Memphis, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), where the court stated:
This Court has been disturbed by the variations in fee awards that have come before
it on review, and by a marked failure on the part of the district courts to explain their
reasoning, make necessary findings of fact, or demonstrate the calculations used to
arrive at a fee. Such awards may well constitute an abuse of discretion while rendering
such awards virtually unreviewable.
ld. See Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra note 67, at 810, 836-37.
88 Following the Supreme Court's strict limitations of the courts' equitable power to award fees
in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), Congress expanded the
statutory basis for fee shifting. With passage of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), in particular, fees became available in a host of nonmonetary cases. Indeed,
civil rights cases now account for more than one-sixth of all federal suits. Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).
" See, e.g., Ramsey, Calculation of Attorney's Fee Awards in Title VII Actions Against Private Defen-
dants, 58 U. DET. J. Ulm. L. 609 (1981); Berger, supra note 59, at 292 & n.56, 310. The Tenth
Circuit in Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1503 (10th Cir. 1982) (rehearing en bane), held that an
attorney-client contingent fee arrangement did not limit fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The court
concluded, inter alia, that a fee limit would overemphasize the importance of damages in civil rights
cases. 719 F.2d at 1503; but see Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983).
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of contingency and quality, offered the opportunity to place all fee awards — common
fund and statutory, antitrust and civil rights, private practitioner and legal aid attorney
— on the same footing." The circuits quickly extended the lodestar/multiplier analysis
to every type of fee award."
Extension of' the Lindy -Grinnell analysis outside the common fund context, however,
created new difficulties and anomalies. In fixing hours and hourly rates, the Supreme
Court recently recognized that lawyers, in billing paying clients, exercise "billing judg-
ment," and discount hours worked to produce a reasonable total, proportionate to the
amount at issue.92 Lawyers whose fees are assessed by the court, on the other hand, have
little incentive to discount hours worked." In common fund cases, the amount of the
fund provided some guidance as to the reasonableness of the requested fees." In cases
where the monetary recovery is small or nonexistent, there is no external check on the
reasonableness of fees." The result is to place the courts between the Charybdis of
9° The Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act stated that
"[i]t is intended that the amount of fees awarded under (the act] be governed by the same standards
which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not
be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature." S. REP. NO. 10 1 1, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. The Report provided
that counsel should be paid, "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client,
'for time reasonable [sic] expended on a matter.'" Id. (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8
PRAC. DEC. (CCH) II 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974)). The Report cited, with approval, three cases
awarding "fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls
to attorneys." Id. In the first case, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the
court, citing both Lindy and Johnson, provided fees for time spent at $50 per hour, and then
enhanced the amount to compensate for "the contingent nature of the representation, the quality
of the attorneys' work, and results." In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D.
483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), the court awarded a lump sum after considering nine factors which included
the result, the time and labor involved and the contingency of the fee. In Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224 (D.C. Cal. 1973), the court relied on Johnson to award
a lump sum reflecting "a balancing of many factors" including the time spent and the results
achieved. The contingency of the representation was not mentioned. The Senate Report thus
insisted that the fee standards under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act be the same as
those applied to "other types of equally complex Federal litigation" without choosing between the
different approaches employed in other cases. Indeed, the Report, which itself seems to place the
primary weight on hours spent, nonetheless cited three cases which gave significant weight to "the
results achieved" and which did not agree among themselves whether and how the contingent
nature of the representation was to be recognized.
91 See supra note 79.
92 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880,
891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane)). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983) ("In
sum, the district court must carefully scrutinize the total number of hours ... much as a senior
partner in a private firm would review the reports of subordinate attorneys when billing clients
whose fee arrangement requires a detailed report of hours expended and work done.").
9° See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 71 i F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983);
Merola 1, 493 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974); Harris v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 197 F,2d 829 (7th Cit ., 1952).
indeed, the judicial tendency to reduce to some degree whatever hours are claimed tends to
encourage inflation simply to ensure full compensation for reasonable hours. In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra
note 67, at 810.
94 See, e.g., Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 118 (defining the result obtained as an important factor in
assessing the quality of the work performed). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients 1, supra
note 20 (noting that the common fund, in any event, set an absolute limit on recovery).
95 jacquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The same market-
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extensive, time consuming review and the Scylla of inflated, unnecessary claims. 96 Similar
problems arise in the calculation of billing rates. The courts, setting hourly rates for the
private attorneys most likely to handle common fund cases, have depended primarily
on those attorneys' established billing rates. For the public interest and legal services
attorneys often involved in statutory fee cases, however, the courts have had to approx-
imate prevailing market rates. In selecting the most analogous market, the courts have
sometimes chosen rates at the highest end of the spectrum, that is, those charged
corporate clients by major firms, and sometimes set low rates solely because the claims
vindicated involved little monetary value. 97
The difficulties in determining the inherently discretionary multipliers are more
fundamental. The very notion of a contingency bonus assumes that the market compen-
place factors are often absent from civil rights litigation."). See also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d
880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane) (rejecting the argument that the amount of the recovery should limit
the available fees in favor of a "market value" approach).
w See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1983), where the court held:
In all phases of the fee determination, the district judge must cast a critical eye on the
award request.
Calculation of the lodestar provides an excellent example. Speaking through Chief
Judge Seitz, we have cautioned that determining the base figure is not a mere math-
ematical calculation.
The Second Circuit in Grinnell I similarly recognized that fee setting requires "an enormous amount
of information" and invited discovery, cross examination and evidentiary hearings. 495 F.2d at 472.
At the same time, many courts have decried the amount of judicial time now devoted to
resolving attorney fee disputes. For example, see Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), where
the Court addressed this issue:
As we stated in Hensley, a "request for attorney's fees should not result on a second
major litigation ...." Parties to civil rights litigation in particular should make a
conscientious effort, where a fee award is to be made, to resolve any differences. A
district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining whether
an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness. The court, with its ultimate
knowledge of the litigation, has a responsibility to encourage agreement.
Id. at 1550 n.19 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 437 (1983)). Similarly, the court in Ashton
v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1984) observed:
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia processes a large number
of ... cases where fees may be awarded under statutes .... As a result its workload
has been significantly increased in recent years by contested applications for attorney's
fees. Often these fee requests consume more court time and involve more paperwork
than the underlying case. Unable to settle the question of fees outside the court,
lawyers make excessive claims and then must defend their work against charges of
waste, overstaffing, ineffectiveness and lack of competence. The court is too often
called upon to determine such questions as whether taxi or subway was the proper
mode of transportation for particular errands, or whether certain research was nec-
essary or a specific office or client conference should have taken place. These squabbles
may be as degrading for the lawyers involved as they are distasteful for the courts
which may resolve them.
Id. at 444. See also Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra note 67, at 811 n.70.
" 7 See .supra note 88. See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 13-15 (D.C. Cir.
1984); White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983) (takingjudicial notice "of the
fact that many civil rights practitioners do not bill their clients at an hourly commercial rate");
Diamond, The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420, 1421-22 (1983); Comment,
Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra note 67, at 810 ("some antitrust attorneys handle such a large
volume of contingent work that they might not have a fixed hourly rate"); Comment, Calculation of
a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976. 13 J. MAR. L. REV.
331 (1980).
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sates for risk," and that guaranteed payment can be equated with contingent fees by
multiplying standard hourly rates by a factor accounting for risk. 99 In fact, however,
there is no necessary relationship between clients willing to pay fees on an hourly basis
and those desiring contingent representation. Different types of legal representation
lend themselves to particular types of fee arrangements.
Major law firms, for example, often refuse as a matter of policy to handle any
contingent fee cases except occasional pro bono suits.m At the same time, segments of
the bar specializing in the representation of plaintiffs in cases such as personal injury
suits and antitrust actions may handle the major part of their caseload on a contingent
fee basis. 101 Public interest and legal services organizations and some private practitioners
exist primarily, often exclusively, to handle non-fee generating cases concerning specific
and often particularly unsettled areas of law. 102 Other lawyers are underemployed and
are therefore willing to handle cases where payment will be delayed or where the fees
will be less then their "normal" billing rates. WS To the extent the market for legal services
is in fact so segmented, any equation between contingent recoveries and noncontingent
hourly payment will vary for each market segment complicating any precise determi-
nation of an appropriate multiplier. 1'4
" See Grinnell 1, 495 F.2d at 471; Lindy 1, 487 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1973); Leubsdorf, The
Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 480-81; Berger, .supra note 59, at 324-25. At the same time,
quality bonuses and adjustments tailored to the particular purposes of the statutory authorization
may bear no relationship to market incentive. See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31,
at 480 n.41.
99 Berger has argued that rational, profit-seeking attorneys should be indifferent between
certain fees at $100 per hour and a 50% chance to recover fees of $200 per hour. Berger, supra
note 59, at 324-25. See also Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 480-81 and
authorities cited at 481; Sprinder, Fee Awards in Antitrust Litigation, 44 ANTITRUST L.j. 97, 103 (1975).
Cf. Liffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 26-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
These pro bono suits are rarely motivated by profit considerations. Therefore, it would
require substantially larger fees to persuade a firm able to secure ample noncontingent work 'to
take more of these cases because of enhanced fee prospects. See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor,
supra note 31, at 493; see also infra note 109.
101 See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 491, and authorities cited therein;
Steele & Rothe, supra note 76, at 1066.
In See White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983); Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factor, supra note 31, at 492--93 nn.91 & 95. Indeed, one of the striking differences between
common fund and statutory litigation is that in the former the lodestar/multiplier analysis is
replacing a contingent, percentage of recovery fee, while for the latter, this lodestar analysis is
replacing noncontingent hourly rates, altruistic representation, or some combination of the two
such as a sliding scale of noncontingent hourly rates dependent on the client's ability to pay. Laffey
v. Northwest Airlines , Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 14-15 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Breger, supra note 19,
at 251 n.16. .
' 0, See generally Greene, Lawyers Versus The Marketplace, FORBES, January 16, 1984, at 72. See also
Clermont & Currivan, Improving On the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 551-55 (1978).
Hi' For example, common fund cases typically involve complex antitrust or stockholders' deriv-
ative actions, large funds, plaintiff's counsel relying on percentage awards, and defense lawyers
charging rates among the highest in the profession. In civil rights cases, on the other hand, where
the monetary stake is more likely to be small, the plaintiffs' bar consists of profit-motivated practi-
tioners relying on a mixture of adjustable hourly rates and statutory awards and more altruistic
attorneys supported by grants or separate profit oriented practices, and the defendants' lawyers
vary from high priced corporate firms to small practitioners or in-house counsel. For judicial
comment on the structure of the civil rights' legal market, see New York State Ass'n of Retarded
Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148-53 (2d Cir. 1983); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d
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Moreover, the impact of contingency bonuses may vary with particular classes of
cases. In common fund cases, the courts were attempting to eliminate the abuses of
percentage recoveries while preserving the fee incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers accepting
cases on a contingent basis. 105
 Under both private fee arrangements and court ordered
awards, the benefiting client paid fees in accordance with the risks taken on the client's
behalf and the benefit received. In statutory fee cases, however, contingent fee arrange-
ments are far more rare 106
 and, in any event, it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who
pays the fees. Multipliers tied to the prevailing plaintiff's risk of defeat therefore penalize
most severely those defendants with the relatively strongest cases, the most justifiable
conduct, or the most reasonable basis for pursuing the litigation. 107
760, 770 (7th Cir. 1982); Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496, 503 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Keyes v.
School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 439 F. Supp. 393, 405 (D. Colo, 1977). For the structure of
the antitrust bar, see Sprinder, supra note 99, at 118-19; Developments, 7 CLASS ACTION REP. 167
(May-June 1981); Developments, 6 CLASS ACTION REP. 82 (March-April 1980); Developments, 5 CLAss
ACTION REP. 331 ( July-August 1978); Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fees Awards, supra note 67, at
810, 822-23 & nn.133, 137. See also Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984) (the
Supreme Court noted that: "[wie recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate 'market
rate' for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult").
155
	 see Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note Si, at 489 (noting that even in common
fund cases, the defendant may effectively bear the cost of the fee award).
LOS
 Indeed, the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act has been applauded precisely because
the low monetary recoveries common in civil rights actions make contingent fee arrangements
improbable. Generally, fee arrangements in this area are noncontingent hourly rates, altruistic
representation by a firm acting pro bond or a legal services organization, a sliding noncontingent
hourly fee tied to ability to pay, or a contingent agreement based on the availability of a statutory
fee award. See supra notes 90 and 104.
1 °7
 The court in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977) (Prandini I),
observed:
We are aware of the differences in rationale underlying the awards of fees from a
fund produced for the benefit of a class and those provided by statute. In the former
case, the court exercises its equitable jurisdiction over the relationship between an
attorney and his amorphous client, and factors which would appropriately have influ-
enced the fee arrangement made between private parties, such as the contingency of
the litigation, are relevant. In the latter case, the statutory fee is often part of the
defendant's penalty for violating the applicable law. Contingency may be of little
significance in that situation if the result is to give a smaller fee to the plaintiff's lawyer
who recovers from a defendant in flagrant violation than the attorney who succeeds
in establishing liability in a very close case. The contingency factor would be less where
the liability is easily proved than where it is questionable. Hence, the penalty fastened
on the defendant would vary in inverse proportion to the strength of the case against
him.
Id. at 1020. See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983), in which the court stated:
Where, as in this case, the award is statutory, the assessment of a counsel fee is to
some extent a penalty for violating the law. From the 'defendant's standpoint, then, it
is inconsistent to increase the fee when the defendant's liability was doubtful, but
reduce it when the violation was flagrant and easily proved. The contingency factor
loses its legitimacy when the penalty imposed on the party at fault is in inverse
proportion to its culpability.
Id. at 673. See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlihes, Inc., 746 F.2d. 4, 27 n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("Supplying a bonus for accepting marginal or risky cases ... could attract competent counsel away
from prosecuting clear violations of rights in favor of cases with a higher potential award."); Hughes
v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., concurring); Herzel & Hagen, Plaintiff's
Attorneys' Fees in Derivative Class Actions, 7 LITIGATION 25 (1981); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor,
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Determination of the utility and optimal size of multipliers requires the courts to
start with the objectives the fee award was intended to serve. With common fund awards,
the test is benefit to the client; thus, rewarding risk and quality are appropriate.'" In
determining statutory fees, the courts must balance plaintiff's incentives against the
penalty imposed on defendants. Lodestar adjustments to compensate for risk and to
reward quality are still facially appealing, but there is an empirical question as to whether
such adjustments increase the availability of representation,'" and a policy question as
to whether the least meritorious cases should be encouraged.u°
supra note 31, at 488, et seg.; Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act, 80 Corum. L. REV. 346 (1980); Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra note 67,
at 812 (noting distinctions between common fund awards and Clayton Act fees assessed against
defendants). Accord, Vecchoine v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776, 794 (ED. Pa. 1979). But see Hall
v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1984); infra note 117.
tc* Since the involuntary client benefited directly from the degree of risk and the quality of
services, it is appropriate that the fee in such cases be fixed accordingly. As Professor Leubsdorf
has pointed out, however, this increases the conflict of interest for the attorney arguing that his
fees should be increased at the expense of an unconsenting client with no other representation.
Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 501-12. Rewarding risk may also encourage
attorneys to bring less meritorious cases. See infra note 110.
109 Breger argues that an after-the-fact discretionary bonus is unlikely ever to influence an
attorney to take an otherwise undesirable case. He suggests that the availability of such bonuses
may only enhance the incentive to work harder on a case once the decision to handle it is made.
Breger, supra note 19, at 259. Professor Leubsdorf also found that retroactive evaluation of the
prospects of success is "burdensome, complicated and often of doubtful propriety," while unpre-
dictable or inaccurate bonuses may fail to act as an incentive at all. Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factor, supra note 31, at 485-88, 493-97. At the same time, some recognition of risk and delay in
payment may be necessary to ensure the availability of competent representation. See id. at 493;
Berger, supra note 59, at 324-25. The conclusion again depends on an analysis of the particular
market. Professor Leubsdorf points out that the prospect of an accurate contingency bonus may
be insufficient to persuade a lawyer who must forego a percentage of recovery arrangement to take
the case. Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 493. At the same time, such a bonus
may be more than sufficient to persuade an altruistic or underemployed attorney to handle the
case. See, e.g., New York Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983)
(contingency bonuses are a 'windfall" for institutions whose raison d'etre is to represent the indigent
in cases on the cutting edge of the law).
114 See supra note 103. To resolve these difficulties, Professor Leubsdorf recommends a standard
contingency multiplier, set by the courts or the legislature for particular classes of cases, or simply
set at two for all cases. Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor, supra note 31, at 501-12. His proposal
has considerable merit in the common fund context where contingency awards have traditionally
been high, see supra notes 86 and 87, and the conflict of interest between attorneys and their
beneficiaries is at its height. Indeed, such a standardized multiplier would have effects similar to
the contingent fee agreements the Lindy-Grinnell analysis was intended to replace. Like contingent
fees, the multiplier would be the same regardless of the degree of risk in a particular case. Such a
standardized multiplier would encourage attorneys to evaluate cases more carefully before agreeing
to take them, discouraging weaker suits. In statutory cases, contingency multipliers do not ordinarily
serve as a substitute for a contingent fee award, see supra note 103, and multipliers as high as two
are far more rare, see supra notes 86 and 87. The Leubsdorf proposal would institutionalize a
doubling of the normal billing rates on which the courts are placing their primary emphasis. Blum
v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984); Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099; Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 118. Moreover,
even if the standard rate for statutory cases were set at a lower figure, it would preclude a case-by-
case balancing of the competing interests in those cases. To evaluate the utility of a standard
multiplier for statutory cases — indeed, to determine whether there should ever be a contingency
bonus in those cases — there must first he a determination of t.he purpose such a bonus would
serve. Is it to ensure the availability of representation in every case, to give the greatest priority to
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Concerned with the growth in both the number and size of statutory awards, the
appellate courts have recently begun to deal with these difficulties." The courts have
paid surprising attention to the calculation of hours and hourly rates, determinations
that in other contexts might be treated as findings of fact." 2 In these decisions, the
courts have insisted on the detailed articulation of the basis for fee awards" 3 and they
have imposed a measure of moderation in lodestar enhancements." 4 Moreover, they
have demonstrated greater, though not always consistent, sensitivity to the differences
between statutory and common law awards." 5
elimination of the most Hagrant abuses, to encourage novel and risky cases at the cutting edge of
the law, to penalize defendants, to reimburse plaintiffs, or to provide a bounty for fortune seeking
attorneys? I believe that contingency bonuses, if they are allowed in statutory cases, should remain
circumspect (below 1.5) and should be tied primarily to delay in payment or a finding that the
noncontingent compensation provided would otherwise be so far below contingent market rates as
to preclude nonaltruistic representation.
1 " Set, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1983) (court of appeals agreed with
district court that "more specific guidelines [for district courts to apply in setting fee awards] are
necessary, and we proceed to set forth standards for district court to follow"). See also National
Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc, v. Environmental Protection Agency, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d
880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611
F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 2 See, e.g., Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 215, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1983);
Johnson v. University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 1983);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1982). But see Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines,
719 F.2d 670, 674-75 (3d Cir. 1983) (insistence that district court, not appellate court, "possesses
the authority to exercise fee setting discretion").
" 3 See, e.g., Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983); Donnell v. United
States, 682 F.2d 240, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (where the opponent of a fee application raises specific
and substantial questions about the number of hours worked, the court must state specifically why
the claims lack merit), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.,
624 F.2d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611
F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979) (requiring that "the district court make clear and adequate findings
of fact on the record"); Barber v. KimbrelFs, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating fee
award because of district court failure to make "detailed findings of fact with regard to the factors
considered"), cell, denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978); Matter of First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d
1291, 1300 (501 Cir. 1977). At the district court level, the courts have in turn insisted on thoroughly
documented hours, with close judicial review. See, e.g., Institutionalized juveniles v. Secretary of
Public Welfare, 568 F. Supp. 1020, 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hall v. City of Auburn, 567 F. Supp.
1222, 1227-29 (D. Me. 1983).
"' See e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (contingency
bonus in exceptional case only; not "exceptional" where chance of prevailing is 50%); Murray v.
Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673
(3d Cir. 1983); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983); In
re Illinios Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1983) (re-
ducing multiplier of 3 to 20% bonus); Strama v. Peterson, 689 F.2d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 1982) (the
contingent nature of the fee "alone does not justify the• use of the multiplier"); Chrapliwy v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 777 (7th Cir. 1982) (instruction to district court to consider possibility
of double counting in high hourly rates and quality increase); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric,
Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Although the district court found that counsels' represen-
tation was commendable and the fee contingent in nature, these two factors alone do not warrant
an award fifty percent in excess of normal hourly rates."); Hall v. City of Auburn, 567 F. Supp,
1222, 1230 (D. Me. 1983). •
15 See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 14-15 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Johnson
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The greatest continuing difficulty" 6 in setting attorneys' fees is the lack of agreement
among the circuits on the appropriate bases for lodestar adjustments. The circuits have
split on the question of whether contingency bonuses are ever appropriate in statutory
fee cases.I 37 While the appellate courts which allow for such increases agree that contin-
gency is to be defined in terms of risk," 8 some describe the risk as that of defeat while
other courts are more concerned with the risk of nonpayment."' Later cases have added
v, University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In the last
analysis, however, the fulfillment of the congressional purpose depends upon the ultimate judge-
ment of the district court, not just the mechanical application of established principles . , .. The
fees awarded ... should reflect the congressional purpose in enacting the Fees Act and Title VII.");
Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982) (adjustment of Johnson
guidelines to take into consideration financial ability of losing plaintiff to pay attorneys' fees in Title
VII cases); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1982) (Tilhe statute [Title
VIII should be liberally rather than restrictively interpreted with respect to fees for services not
performed, in the ordinary sense, in proceedings before the Title VII court. The Supreme Court
expressly recognized that a liberal view toward fees would further Congress' goal of '[making] it
easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.'" (citations omitted)); In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 583, n.19 (3d Cir. 1984) ("With little or no analysis of the
substantial differences between the two situations, this court transferred to litigated disputes over
liability for statutory fees many of the standards for judicial scrutiny of the fee awards first developed
in the fund in court cases . „ . The public policy considerations in the two situations are obviously
not identical."). See also supra note 107; Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 672 F.2d 42, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adding "benefits to the public" as an additional factor to
consider based on the legislative history of the statute).
In restraining the size of contingency bonuses, some courts have emphasized the anomalous
role of such bonuses in statutory fee cases while still permitting relatively large upward adjustments
in common fund awards. Compare Ursic V. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983), with In
re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn.
1978); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Arenson v. Board of Trade of City
of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
116 That is, the greatest difficulty aside from the inevitable one of the increasing judicial
resources necessary to provide the close scrutiny, and detailed findings mandated by these cases.
See supra notes 77 and 96.
10 The early cases following Lindy and Johnson awarded contingency bonuses in statutory cases
with little analysis. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 770 (7th Cir. 1982); Northcross
v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 643 (6th Cir. 1979). Later, the Third
Circuit criticized such bonuses, emphasizing the anomalies arising from the imposition of such
bonuses at the defendants' expense. See supra note 107 and Third Circuit cases cited therein. Since
Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984) (discussed infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text),
however, the appellate courts have had to face directly the issue of whether contingency increases
are ever permitted in statutory cases, and the Third Circuit has upheld, at least in principle, the
availability of such increases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838,
842-43 (3d Cir. 1984). The Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, on the other hand, have
questioned the appropriateness of contingency bonuses in § 1988 cases. See McKinnon v. City of
Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The fundamental problem of a risk bonus is that it
compensates attorneys, indirectly but effectively, for bringing unsuccessful civil rights suits, even
though the attorney's fee statute is expressly limited to cases where the party seeking the fee
prevails. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1988."); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 26-28 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
" 8 Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 168; Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 505
(2d Cir. 1980). See also National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d
1319, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982);. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane).
19 The greatest variation on this issue has involved treatment of legal services' fee prospects.
As noted above, the court in Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980), found that case
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inflation and delay in payment to the contingency factor, sometimes as a single item and
other times calculated separately.'" While the Second and Third Circuits have kept
quality increases distinct front and more moderate than contingency increases, few other
circuits have defined the relationship and many have included additional considera-
tions. 12 ' Yet, effective appellate review is illusory without limiting lodestar increases to a
few clearly articulated factors.
The Supreme Court, a newcomer to fee calculation, has compounded this confusion
in the recent decisions which it has handed down in this area. In the 1983 case of Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 122 a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Supreme Court ruled on the
availability of fees for time spent on issues on which the plaintiff did not prevail.
Addressing the manner of fee calculation for the first time, the Court embraced the
Lindy -Grinnell emphasis on hours worked, explaining that:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable
fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on
which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services.'"
After the Court noted its approval of the guidance provided by hours worked, it none-
theless cautioned that:
"extraordinarily contingent" in large part because of legal service's limited fee prospects. In contrast,
the Second Circuit has barred contingency bonuses for legal services entirely because such firms
"exist to represent groups like the Willowbrook class, with constitutional claims at the cutting edge
of the law"; i.e. indigent clients with uncertain likelihood of success. New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983). See Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, Denver, Colo., 439 F. Supp. 393, 405 (D. Colo. 1977), finding for public interest groups involved
that:
the concept of "risks involved" and inherent preclusion of other employment, as used
in the usual sense, have no real significanCe. [These groups] exist for the express
purpose of participating in school desegregation litigation and are funded for that
purpose through private sources. The risks in this particular case were similar to the
risks in other cases accepted by the two legal units.
See also Vecchoine v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776, 794-95 (F.D. Pa. 1979); Barrett v. Kalinowski,
458 F. Supp. 689, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("The legal services organization [and, thus,] its resources
including lawyers' time were not so risked."); Lund v. Affleck, 442 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-17 (D.R.1.
1977) (finding that all legal aid cases were "completely contingent on success," but declining to
award multiplier). Cr Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 558 (10th Cir. 1983) (commenting that "(s)orne
courts appear to give a multiplier or bonus simply because the lawyers would have received nothing
had they not won and some chance of losing always exists").
120
 Johnson v. University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 1983)
(reversing district court opinion for failure to consider delay in payment); National Ass'n of
Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 672 F.2d 42, 59 (D,C. Cir. 1982); Copeland v.
Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Ca.
1980); see supra note 87.
' 21 Nor do the courts always agree on the definitions of these terms. Compare Lindy I, 487 F.2d
at 168 (complexity and novelty are treated as part of the definition of quality), with Cohen v. West
Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1980) (the "risk and complexity of the
litigation" as one factor and the "quality of representation" as a second factor). Novelty and
complexity have also been treated as separate factors. See Strama v. Peterson, 689 F.2d 661, 665
(7th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1981); Blum v. Stenson, 512 F.
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
in 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
ISO Id. at 433.
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The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the
inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court
to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the
"results obtained." 124
In dicta, the Court thus suggested that enhancements to the lodestar were appropriate,
but it identified only one factor — results obtained — which could be used by the courts
to adjust fees. 125
As the Supreme Court's then sole pronouncement on the subject of lodestar ad-
justments, the statement proved to be a misleading guide for the lower courts. By citing
the Johnson factors rather than Lindy or Grinnell, ' 26 the Hensley decision triggered renewed
emphasis on the size of the recovery, the very factor Lindy and Grinnell attempted to
deemphasize.'" Moreover, the emphasis on the "results obtained" without reference to
the contingency or quality factors suggested that the results should be treated as an
independent factor rather than as a single element within the larger context supplied
by Lindy, Grinnell and their progeny.' 28 The Supreme Court decision thus lent support
to larger awards by the lower courts.
In Blum v. Stenson, 129 decided a year after Hensley, the Supreme Court joined in the
call for fee restraint, without completing the framework for setting fees. Like Hensley,
Blum involved a section 1988 fee award. Relying on this statute's legislative history, the
Court ruled that fee awards under the statute could be calculated in accordance with
prevailing market rates and that lodestar adjustments could be included as part of a
124 Id. at 434.
'" In Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), the Court observed that:
[r]esults obtained is one of the twelve factors identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, 488 F.2d at 718, as relevant to the calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee.
It is "particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed 'prevailing' even though he
succeeded on only some of his claims for relief." Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 (Fee award
must be reduced by the number of hours spent on unsuccessful claims). Because
acknowledgment of the "results obtained" generally will be subsumed within other
factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it normally should not provide an indepen-
dent basis for increasing the fee award.
Mum, 104 S. Ct. at 1549-50. The Hensley reference to results obtained may reflect the Court's
preoccupation with the question of fees assessed for time spent on losing issues more than it does
the Court's assessment of the appropriate bases for lodestar adjustments.
' 26 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30.
127 See Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099; Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 471. In Attorneys' Fees in Class
Actions, A Report to the Federal Judicial Center (1980), Professor Miller conducted a study which
indicated that the result continued to be important in the Second and Third Circuits.
128 Cf. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), see supra note 125. See, e.g., Action on Smoking
and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The Supreme Court has
placed even greater emphasis on the outcome, stating that 'the most critical factor is the degree of
success obtained,' and '[t]he result is what matters."); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557 (10th
Cir. 1983) (citing Hensley and treating "exceptional success" as an independent factor); White v.
City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Hensley and stating that "the 'degree of
success' or 'results' obtained is the most critical" factor in adjusting the fee upward or downward);
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 568 F. Supp. 1020, 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
("Hensley affects the Lindy analysis ... [by emphasizing] an additional factor justifying adjustment
of the lodestar, i.e., the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee
award,"),
129 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1549-50 (1984).
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"reasonable fee."'" The Court reversed, however, the 50% lodestar increase awarded
below, ruling that the district court, which referred to the complexity of the litigation,
the novelty of the issues, the high quality of the representation, the "great benefit to the
class," and the "riskiness" of the law suit, had failed to justify the increase."'
In reviewing the multiplier, the Court held, first, that "[n]either complexity nor
novelty of the issues ... is an appropriate factor in determining whether to increase the
basic fee award" since these factors "presumably were• fully reflected in the number of
billable hours." 132 The Court reasoned further that "the 'quality of representation' . .
generally is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate" and that it "may justify an upward
adjustment only in the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show
that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect
in light of the hourly rates charged and that the success was 'exceptional. — "3 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the lodestar increase awarded by the district court in Blunt
justified by the same factors — the quality of representation and the complexity of the
litigation — used to justify high hourly rates "is a clear example of double counting." 134
The Court also rejected any increase based on the "great benefit" to the class, explaining
that "[b]ecause acknowledgement of the 'results obtained' generally will be subsumed
within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it should normally not provide
an independent basis for increasing the fee award." 135
Finally, the Supreme Court found unsubstantiated the district court's conclusion
that the "issues presented were novel and the undertaking therefore risky." 136 In reaching
this decision, the Court declined "to consider whether the risk of not being the prevailing
party in a section 1983 case, and therefore not being entitled to an award of attorney's
fees from one's adversary, may ever justify an upward fee adjustment."'”
The Blunt decision thus affirmed the availability of lodestar adjustments without
finalizing the acceptable basis for such increases. The Court has not yet ruled on the
propriety of the contingency factor in statutory cases while limiting quality increases to
"the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show that the quality of service
rendered was superior to that one should reasonably expect in light of the hourly rates
charged and that the success was exceptional."'m Correcting the misimpression Hensley cre-
"° Id. at 1546. The Court did not clearly indicate, however, whether multipliers were to be
considered part of the determination of prevailing rates or adjustments to such rates undertaken
for noneconomic reasons.
"I Id. at 1547-48.
"2 Id. at 1548. The Court added that:
[tihere may be cases, of course, where the experience and special skill of the attorney
will require the expenditure of fewer hours than counsel normally would be expected
to spend on a particularly novel or complex issue. In those cases, the special skill and
experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates.
Id. Cf. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117 (definition of "quality" in terms of "the complexity and novelty of
the issues presented, the quality of the work the judge has been able to observe, and the amount
of the recovery obtained").
193
 Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1549.
134 Id.
135 ird,
"6 Id, at 1550.
I" Id. at 1550 n.17. Cf. id. at 1550 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that "the risk of not
prevailing, and therefore the risk of not recovering any attorney's fees, is a proper basis on which
a district court may award an upward adjustment to an otherwise compensatory fee").
"8 Id. at 1549 (emphasis added).
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ated, the Court rejected consideration of the "results obtained" except as part of the
determination of extraordinary quality and rejected altogether consideration of "com-
plexity" or "novelty." 135 The Court also gave renewed weight to the burden on the
prevailing party to justify any lodestar increase, necessarily increasing the duty of the
lower court to articulate the basis for such an increase.'" Following Blum, the lower
courts have a mandate to restrain quality increases. Yet the decision leaves the applica-
bility of contingency bonuses to statutory fees unsettled.' 4 '
To determine whether contingency bonuses are ever appropriate in statutory cases,
the courts will finally have to separate statutory awards from common fund fees. In
determining common fund awards, contingency bonuses are firmly established as a
substitute for the percentage of recovery fees charged paying clients.' 42 In civil rights
and environmental litigation, Congress provided for fee awards precisely because con-
tingent representation was unlikely to be sufficient to vindicate the nonmonetary prin-
ciples involved. The "prevailing market rates" for most civil rights and other statutory
cases is an hourly fee. 145 Thus, the availability of contingency bonuses in those cases is a
question of statutory construction dependent on the statute's legislative history — did
Congress intend "market rates" to include bonuses for contingent representation?1+4 —
and congressional policy — are hourly rates alone sufficient to secure competent counsel
in civil rights and environmental cases?' 45
Recognition of differences in fee calculation dictated by statutory differences would
do much to slow, though probably not halt, the "common law" development of fee setting
rules. Fee calculation, after all, should never have been a common law matter at all. The
resolution of attorney-client disputes is a contract question dependent on the intent of
the parties. The calculation of the fees which benefiting nonclients owe the creators of
a common fund bear no necessary relationship to the fees a defendant owes a prevailing
plaintiff. Civil rights and environmental fees should be determined in accordance with
the provisions and purposes of the statute which authorized the award. Yet, deference
to the nearest colorable precedent has been too deeply ingrained for the courts to ignore
when confronted with a new type of fee award. With each successive provision author-
izing attorneys' fees, the courts have applied — too often mechanically — the fee doctrine
developed for the last award. In the meantime, the solutions to the problems posed by
the last set of awards create the anomalies perpetuated in the calculation of the new
Ls9 Id.
4 4° Throughout the Blum decision, the Court asserted that the "burden of proving that such an
adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee is on the fee applicant," id. at
1548, that the fee applicant must offer "specific evidence" to meet that burden, id. at 1549, that
the district court must do more than conclusorily state its reasons to justify such an increase, id. at
1548-50, and that the cases "in which an upward adjustment to the presumptively reasonable fee
of rate times hours" will be "appropriate" are "rare," id. at 1550 n.18.
141 Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to address the propriety of contingency bonuses, much
less their determinants or the scope of their applicability. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746
F.2d 4, 26-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Following Blum, the circuits have split on the question. See supra
note 117. See supra note 110 for a discussion of the merits of contingency bonuses.
142 After all, common fund awards are most likely to occur in antitrust, shareholder's derivative
or other actions, where the "market rate" for plaintiffs' counsel's services is a contingent rate. See
supra note 104.
145 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 90, 130, 137 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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awards. Only by treating statutory fee calculation as a matter of statutory construction
and by honoring the distinctions between different types of awards can the courts hope
to reconcile fee calculation with the purposes the awards were intended to service.
THE EXPANDED AVAILABILITY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
THE EQUAL ACCESS To JUSTICE ACT
The Equal Access to Justice Act, passed by Congress in 1979, was enacted within
the changing landscape established by common fund and civil rights fee awards. None-
theless, the Act was intended to serve different purposes through methods different
from its fee shifting predecessors, common law and statutory. 146 The breadth of the
statute itself is unprecedented. The EAJA enacts a wholesale waiver of sovereign im-
munity and of the American rule requiring each party to bear its own fees. 1 4 7 The Act
permits any individual whose net worth does not exceed $2 million or any corporation
worth less than $7 million to recover attorneys' fees from the United States for prevailing
in a suit in which the court finds that the government's position is not "substantially
16 The original act contained a sunset provision repealing the EAJA effective October 1, 1984.
Act of Oct. 2!, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS (94 Stat.) 2329 (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. 2412). On October 11, 1984, Congress unanimously passed H.R. 5479,
which would have made the experimental legislation permanent. The President vetoed the bill on
November 9, 1984, objecting to the new definition of "position of the United States," as the
government's administrative position rather than its litigation position. The President explained
that the new definition could lead to lengthier proceedings and extensive discovery. EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE ACT AMENDMENTS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1985). Congress passed a compromise bill this session which eliminates the sunset provision.
This legislation broadly defines the position of the Unites States to include both the government's
administrative and litigation positions. The amendments limit the determination of those positions
to "the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon
which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses
are sought." Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. II, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 574 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)).
The legislative history indicates that in cases "conceded on the merits," the record "will consist of
the pleadings, affidavits and other supporting documents filed by the parties in both the fee
proceeding and the case on the merits." EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AMENDMENTS, COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985).
147 The Supreme Court, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), reaffirmed the "American rule" that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Id. at 247. The Court recognized three exceptions
to the rule. First, it recognized:
the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party
preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to
recover his costs, including his attorneys' fees from the fund or property itself or
directly from other parties enjoying the benefit.
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted). Second, the Court recognized the inherent power of the courts to
"assess attorneys' fees for the 'willful disobedience of a court order' .. , as part of the fine to be
levied on the defendant ... or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly
or for oppressive reasons. — Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted). Third, the Court recognized as an
exception specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes
granting or protecting various federal rights. Id. at 254-57.
The Alyeska Court further ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 expressly barred taxation of fees against
the United States. Id. at 267-68. The Court concluded that any additional fee shifting, including
fee shifting under a private attorney general analysis must be authorized by Congress. Id. at 269.
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justified." 148 An award may, however, be denied if a court finds that special circumstances
exist which would "make an award unjust." 149
The focus of the EAJA, more than that of other fee shifting statutes, 130 is economic.
Congress passed the legislation, not to vindicate narrowly defined rights deemed to be
of special importance," 1 but to alter the financial balance between the government and
those with whom the government does business. 152 If there is a prototypical person
inspiring congressional passion, it is a small business executive, subject to unjust regu-
lation, but unable to fight back because the legal fees would exceed the amount in
controversy. 153 The legislation is thus more concerned with overturning egregious gov-
348 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982). The newly passed bill amends the definition of party to
include individuals whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed
or corporations with a net worth of less than $7,000,000 and not more than 500 employees. Pub.
L. No. 97-248, fit. II, § 292(c), 96 Stat. 574 (1982) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)).
The bill also changes the definition of "position of the United States" which has been defined as
the litigation by a majority of the courts, to include "in addition to the position taken by the United
States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based." Id.
' 49 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
I" Federal statutes authorizing fees are set forth in Federal Statutes that Authorize Awards of
Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 611 -29 (1980)
(Appendix 5) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government].
15 ' In hearings before Congress, Assistant Attorney General Alice Daniels stated:
Until about the mid-1960's, the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914)) was the basis for
most statutory fee awards. Within the past dozen years or so, however, Congress has
enacted a number of laws containing provisions for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
With each of these statutes, Congress has enacted specific standards to meet the
particular needs of particular problems in discrete subject areas. Each represents the
expression of congressional intent to encourage citizens to advance the interests of
specific important social goals. As the legislative history to the Freedom of Information
Act notes, "Nile allowance of a reasonable attorneys' fee out of government funds to
prevailing parties in litigation has been considered desirable where the suit advances
a strong congressional policy. 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6267, 6272 (1974)."
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBJC Authority and General Small Business Problems, House
Committee on Small Busine,s.s Problems, House Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 175
(1980) (prepared statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department
of Justice, Judicial Access/Court Costs) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: Judicial Access/Court Costs], See
also Oguachuba v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93 99 (2d Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., 125 CONC. REC. S10915 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (Sen. Dole) ("A balance needs to
be established between the rights of Americans and Government regulations. This bill offers that
balance .. . ."); id. at 510922 (Sen. Nelson) (bill will "balance the scales of justice"); 126 CONG. REC.
H588 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1980) (statement of Rep. McDade) ("balance scales of justice''); 126 CONG.
REC. H585 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Bereuter) ("corrects imbalance"). See also Act
of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (setting forth statutory purposes).
15 ' The congressional sponsors repeatedly referred to the plight of the small businessman,
unable to challenge government misconduct because of prohibitive legal fees. See, e.g., Equal Access
to Justice Act of 1979, S.265, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979) (opening statement of Senator
DeConcini, legislation sponsor) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: Equal Access to Justice Act of 1979];
Hearings: Judicial AccesslCourt Costs, supra note 160, at 52, 53 (opening statement of Hon. Joseph M.
McDade, legislation sponsor). See also H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980) ("S.265
provides individuals an effective legal or administrative remedy where none now exists"); S. REP.
No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 1005, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980);
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ernment misconduct than with creating new law. 154 The congressional sponsors expressed
greater concern about the aggrieved party's willingness to incur fees than the willingness
of lawyers to take the cases.'" In its methodology, the Act pays greater attention to the
deterrent effect on federal agencies than to the vindication of any single interest. In
short, the Act concentrates on the economics underlying both parties' decision to liti-
gate. 156
Given the congressional concern with access and economic balance rather than
vindication of a particular right, the statute pays special attention to fee calculation.
Open ended fee awards could, on the one hand, magnify the cost to the United States
Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at 32 (statement of
Sen. DeConcini).
' 54
 The statute limits fees to cases in which the government's position is not substantially justified
and grants the courts discretion to deny fees where "special circumstances" would "make an award
unjust." 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). The latter provision is modeled after the standard
developed under the Civil Rights Act. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400
(1968).
In defining "substantially justified," the committee reports provide that:
[t]he test of whether or not a government action is substantially justified is essentially
one of reasonableness. Where the government can show that its case had a reasonable
basis both in law and fact, no award will be made ....
The standard, however, should not be read to raise a presumption that the
Government position was not substantially justified, simply because it lost the case.
Nor, in fact, does the standard require the Government to establish that its decision
to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing. Furthermore, the
Government should not be held liable where "special circumstances would make an
award unjust." This "safety valve" helps to insure that the government is not deterred
from advancing in good faith the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of
the law that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts. It also gives the court
discretion to deny awards where equitable considerations dictate an award should not
be made.
H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 10-11; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 153, at 6-7.
In 1982, Congress rejected proposed amendments which would have required that fees
awarded riot be disproportionate to the amount in controversy. See Implementation of the Equal Access
to Justice Act, Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice, House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong,, 2d Sess. 12, 41, 77 (1982).
156 In describing the plight of small businesses, the congressional sponsors emphasized the
disproportion between legal fees and the amount in controversy rather than the parties' inability
to secure counsel. See supra note 153. Of course, this is not to say that Congress was unconcerned
with the latter.
15€
 In Ogttachuba v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1983), the
Second Circuit recognized that:
[t]he EA JA differs from other statutes, such as the Sherman Act and Civil Rights
Legislation, which authorize an award of counsel fees to a party prevailing on claims
arising under the particular legislation. Awards pursuant to such legislation are usually
the result of Congress's perception of the importance of the underlying statutory
policies, of the need to encourage litigation as a means of enforcement of those policies
or of a desire to see that the damages awarded plaintiffs in such cases are not
diminished by a need to pay counsel. The EAJA differs in that it is not tied to particular
governmental policies but applies generally to civil litigation involving the government.
The purpose of the EAJA is not to enhance enforcement of affirmative governmental
policies but to deter the government from bringing unfounded suits or engaging in
arbitrary or unjust administrative behavior. That goal is in part achieved by rectifying
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Treasury' 57 and chill federal regulation and law enforcement. ' 58 Niggardly awards could,
on the other hand, defeat the purpose of the act by discouraging the client from risking
nonreimbursement or the attorney from risking underpayment. Consequently, to ensure
an appropriate balance, the EAJA, unlike other fee shifting statutes, specifies eligible
activities, hourly rates, and methods of computation.
Where other statutes permit the award of "reasonable fees," 159 the EAJA limits
awards to "fees incurred by that party in any civil action ... brought by or against
the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action .. . ." 16° Fees are thus
restricted to activities necessary to representation of that party, in that action, before that
court. Although the "fees incurred" language does not limit fee awards to fees actually
owed by the elient,' 61 Congress barred fees for intervenors and friends of the court.' 62
By including such restrictions in the statute, Congress invited judicial scrutiny of the
claims submitted.'"
' 57 The legislative history is replete with testimony as to the potential cost and efforts to estimate
and limit that expense. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 7; Hearings: Equal Access to
Justice Act of 1979, supra note 153, at 51 -52; Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal
Government, supra note 150, at 32, 52, 412; Equal Access to Courts, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Hearing: Equal Access to Courts]; The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, Comm, on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 74-76, 83-92, 299 (1977-1978) (statement of Mary Frances
Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: The Awarding of Attorneys'
Fees in Federal Courts],
rsa See, e.g., Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at
21, 27-28, 42, 71; Hearings: Judicial AccesslCourt Costs, .supra note 151, at 178; Hearings: Equal Access
to Justice Act of 1979, supra note 153, at 172; Hearings: Equal Access to Courts, supra note 157, at 31;
Hearings: The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 157, at. 71.
16° See, e.g., Federal Contested Elections Act, 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1982) ("reasonable expenses of
the contested election case, including reasonable attorneys' fees"); Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) ("[t]he court may assess against the United States reasonable attorneys'
fees"); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), (3)(B), (4) (1982); Government in the Sunshine Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (1982); Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(f),
(g) (1982); Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000b-1, 2000e-5(k) (1982). See also
Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at 611.
' 6° 28 U.S.C. § 24 I2(d)(1)(A) (1982).
161 See, e.g., Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937, 947 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1985); San Filippo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 564 F. Supp. 173, 175-77
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Stipp. 372, 376 (M.D. Pa. 1983); flornal v. Schwei-
ker, 551 F. Stipp. 612, 615-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). But see Cornelia v. Schweiker, 552 F. Supp. 240,
245-48 (D.S.D. 1982).
162
	 definition of 'party' would exclude ... those who do not have a direct and personal
interest in the action. It is the belief of your committee that the act should not provide funds for
intervenors, friends of the court, or others who have not been injured or likely to suffer irreparable
harm." H.R. REP. No. 1005, .supra note 153, at 9.
" 63 The statute defines "fees and other expenses" to include "the reasonable expenses of expert
witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test or project which is
found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and the reasonable
attorneys' fees." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982). The House committee report adds that "[y]our
committee expects awards to include the reasonable costs incurred in adequately preparing for a
prosecuting a case." H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 153, at 11. Both the statutory and committee
language suggests that fees should be limited to activities necessary to the litigation even if such
activities are an otherwise reasonable part of representation of the client.
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The EAJA further requires that fees be "based on prevailing market rates " 16  and
that the party submit "an itemized statement from any attorney ... stating the actual
time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed."'"
Adopted well after the Lindy, Grinnell, and Johnson decisions eliminated percentage of
recovery awards,' 66 the statute envisioned an effort to duplicate prevailing hourly rates
for time spent. Congress explained that:
In general, consistent with the above limitations, the computation of attor-
neys' fees should be based on prevailing market rates without reference to
the fee arrangement between the attorney and client. The fact that attorneys
may be providing services at salaries or hourly rates below the standard
commercial rates which attorneys might normally receive for services ren-
dered is not relevant to the computation of compensation under the Act. In
short, the award of fees is to be determined according to general professional
standards.I 67
These provisions reflect the concern with balance — an agency should not be spared
legal fees because a particular client secured below market representation nor penalized
because the client retained the most expensive counsel — and access — below market
fee awards might discourage attorneys from charging less than market rates or from
undertaking the case at all.'"
Perhaps most significantly, Congress set a maximum hourly rate, providing that
"attorneys' fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court deter-
mines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved, justifies a higher fee." 169
Construed expansively, the exception could swallow the rule, but general rules of sta-
tutory construction favor a narrow interpretation. First, the statute generally, and the
provision setting a maximum rate in particular, must be treated as waivers of sovereign
immunity entitled to strict construction.' 7° Second, the provision must be interpreted
consistently with the statutory purposes, and with the itemized factors Congress desig-
' 64 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982).
' 65 1d. at 24 I 2(d)(1)(B).
1 " See Hearings: The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 157, at 289.
' 67 H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 15. See also Awarding of Attorneys' Fees, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, Home Committee on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 127-28, 146, 151-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: Awarding of Attorneys'
Fees); Hearings: The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts, supra note 157, at 29, 289.
' 66 Limiting fee awards to fees owed might discourage pro bona or reduced fee representation
or encourage a client with a particularly strong case to use more expensive outside counsel. The
reference to prevailing rates also provides a check on the employment of overpriced counsel. Cf.
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In Walford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit ruled, correctly in
my view, that a Social Security Act provision limiting contingent fee awards to 25% of the judgment
did not limit EAJA awards to that amount. The court reasoned that such a result would be
inconsistent with the EAJA legislative history precluding consideration of the specific attorney-
client arrangement and the statutory emphasis on avoiding too heavy a reliance on the "amounts
involved." Id. at 1567-69.
169 28 U.S.C. § 24I2(d)(2)(A) (1982).
170 Ruckelshatis v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-85 (1983); see also United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. King, 395 U.S. I, 4 (1968); Underwood v. Pierce, 761
F.2d 1342, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1985).
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nated."' In limiting hourly rates, Congress attempted to balance the exposure of the
United States Treasury with the need to set fees sufficiently high to ensure access to the
courts."2
The provision for higher lees in the event of "special factors, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved," illustrates that balance
and defines the type of factors necessary to justify an exception. In a complicated tax or
patent proceeding, for example, no attorney with expertise in that area, in essense, "no
qualified attorney," might be available at $75 per hour.'" Insistence on a $75 per hour
maximum would thus discourage more technical litigation and defeat the purpose of
the statute. Retention of the $75 limit in a period of rampant inflation would similarly
undermine the statute's effectiveness. At the same time, however, Congress indicated
that neither higher prevailing local rates nor the fact that the best lawyers charged more
could justify higher rates.", The raison (Pere of the EAJA is to ensure access to the court.
Congress's recognition that "special factors" could justify higher fees must be construed
consistently with the economic focus of the Act.'"
" 1 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) ("as in all cases of
statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes
Congress sought to serve"); United States v. Philipp Overseas, Inc., 651 F.2d 747, 751 (C.C.P.A.
1981). See also City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); In re Bradford, 695 F.2d 409
(9th Cir. 1982).
' 72 See supra notes 152 and 157. See also Action on Smoking and Health (A.S.H.) v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 218 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1" See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 217 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The House committee report defines the exception as applying where there is "a limited
availability of qualified attorneys with expertise in the particular proceedings involved." H.R. REP.
No. 1418, supra note 153, at 15.
17' During the hearings in the House of Representatives, Senator DeConcini, the major Senate
sponsor of the legislation, testified before a subcommittee chaired by Congressman Kastenmeier,
one of the chief House sponsors:
Mr. Kastenmeier: As far as lees and expenses, it has limitations, as well, which 1 gather,
would prevent a party from engaging entirely an expensive law firm and being able
entirely to cover all the expenses that might be charged, if they would otherwise
qualify under the bill.
Senator DeConcini: We tried to strike some common ground realizing that the attor-
neys' fees per hour vary immensely wherever it may be. We have communities in my
state that $75 per hour would he almost twice what the going rate is; though in the
large cities it's that or more.
The purpose of our bill, 5.265, as before you today, does not do what Senator
Domenici and Senator Nelson advocate; and that is, really make the taxpayers whole.
„ But, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, when you
get into the process of attempting to grind out legislation, you have to make some
modifications and some compromises; and, indeed, that's what this bill represents.
Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at 32. See also Action
on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ($75 per hour
limit designed to constrain litigants from hiring high-priced lawyers); Hearings: Equal Access to justice
Acl of 1979, supra note 153, at 88.
175 The other exception to the statutory maximum, providing for judicial recognition of "an
increase in the cost of living," is also consistent with that purpose, allowing for judicial adjustment
of the statutory maximum in the event that inflation makes the $75 per hour figure outdated. See
Hearings: Equal Access to Justice Act of 1979, supra note 153, at 95.
In calculating any increase, however, the courts should determine the increase from October
1, 1981, the effective (late of the statute (rather than from the date the services were performed)
and they would do so on a nationwide basis. Otherwise, an increase in the cost of living could be
used to justify higher rates in more expensive urban communities circumventing the EAJ A's efforts
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Reconciling the EAJA with established methods of fee calculation has proved trou-
blesome for the courts. The statute's emphasis on hours multiplied by hourly rates
appears to embrace a conservative lodestar analysis without providing for the lodestar
adjustments that constitute the other half of the Lindy -Grinnell equation. In considering
the application of multipliers, the courts have agreed only that lodestar adjustments
cannot be used to push the effective hourly rate above $75 per hour without an exception
to the statutory cap on fees.]''' The courts have settled on no uniform analysis in deciding
which factors might justify an exception to the $75 per hour fee cap and, indeed, whether
a multiplier is ever permitted under the statute.'''
The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Action
on Smoking and Health (A.S.H.) v. Civil Aeronautics Board and of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Underwood v. Pierce underscore the difficulties which
the courts have had in addressing these issues. In the A.S.H. case, the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged the narrow purpose of the statutory exception, concluding that:
In enacting this fee limitation, Congress attempted to provide full market
compensation for successful litigants while, at the same time, containing cost.
The two special factors specifically enumerated in the statute — cost of living
rises and limited availability of counsel — facilitate flexible adjustment to
special economic circumstances. The cost of living language reflected
congressional awareness that, with inflation, the fee limiting provision could
defeat the purpose of the statute. The limited availability of counsel provision
is directed at another unusual situation where specialized legal services can-
not be obtained in the market for $75 or less.'"
But the court of appeals, ignoring its own analysis of the economic purpose of the
exception, went on to find that:
The Equal Access to Justice Act also gives the court discretion to consider
other, unenumerated special factors. Courts have traditionally conducted
this special factor inquiry in fee cases to insure that unusual circumstances
have not rendered the lodestar formula an improper method of compensa-
tion. As this court held in Copeland v. Marshall, if such special factors as the
contingent nature of success, delay in payment or quality of representation
are present, an adjustment to the lodestar is appropriate. We hold that the
provisions of EAJA are in no way incompatible with the special factor inquiry
required by Copeland. Congress clearly intended that such an inquiry be
undertaken in EAJA cases. 179
The A.S.H. court, however, offered no explanation and no legislative support for its
conclusion that the "special factor" language should be construed independently from
to impose a national statutory maximum. Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
724 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937, 958 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd,
761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra note 174.
176 See, e.g., Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1392, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985); Action on Smoking and
Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp.
937, 952-53, 958 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 761 F.2(1 913 (2d Cir. 1985).
177 See infra note 179.
78 724 F.2d at 217 (footnotes omitted).
' 79 1d. at 218 (footnotes omitted). The Copeland factors are very similar to the Lindy-Grinnell
factors. See supra notes 79 and 118.
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the statute's itemized factors and the specific statutory purposes. UM The anomalous effect
of the A.S.H. decision is to limit hourly rates strictly to $75 per hour while permitting
multipliers to increase those rates on the same bases as any other fee award.nu
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning to
support the opposite methodology in Underwood v. Pierce. Without reference to the
EAJA's legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the consideration of Kerr
[v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.] factors is appropriate in determining the amount of fees to
be awarded under the EAJA." 82 The court of appeals further observed that:
The district court found that an hourly rate in excess of $75 was justified by
several special factors, including the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the
contingent nature of the fee, the undesirability of the case, the expertise of
counsel, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the customary
fees and awards in other cases. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that the hourly rates requested by the Western Center —
ranging from $80 per hour for work in 1976 to $120 per hour for work in
1982 — were appropriate and reasonable under the EAJA.' 83
But the court then prohibited use of a multiplier on the grounds that waivers of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed, and that given the precise statutory limit on fees,
multipliers are inappropriate without a stronger indication of congressional intent.' 84
Thus, the curious result of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Underuiood is to prohibit the
180 The A.S.H. court referred to legislative history indicating that the factors justifying an
exception "are not limited to" those specified, but gave no explanation of why other factors should
not be of a kind similar to those stated. 724 F.2d at 218 n.32.
1 " For example, in analyzing the quality factor, the A.S.H. court ruled that the quality bonus
is limited to performance beyond that expected of an attorney with such established rates. Id. at
219. Accordingly, an attorney charging $150 per hour could not receive more than $75 per hour
for performance one would expect from an attorney able to com mand such rates, but an attorney
ordinarily charging $75 per hour could receive much higher rates for the same performance. In
contrast, the statutorily mandated prevailing market rates make no provision for exceptional per-
formance. An attorney' who agreed to handle a case for $75 per hour would receive only that;
exceptional performance would be rewarded, if at all, by an ability to charge higher rates in
subsequent cases.
IR2 761 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985). See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); supra note 79. The Underwood court cited Save Our
Ecosystem v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 1984), in support of this proposition, but the
earlier Ninth Circuit case had referred to Kerr as generally relevant "to determine the amount of
fees to be awarded". Id. The Save Our Ecosystem court did not specifically consider whether the Kerr
factors were relevant to a waiver of the $75 per hour fee cap. Id. See also Bertrand v. United States,
562 F. Supp. 222, 225 n.5 (D. Ore. 1983) (awarding a multiplier of 1.2 on the basis of the Kerr
factors and concluding that "consideration of the special factors listed in Kerr obviously constitutes
adequate justification for an increase in the 'target rate' [of $75 per hour]") 562 F. Supp. at 225 n.
5.
1 " Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d at 1347.
1 " Id. at 1348. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of a multiplier in LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir. 1985), which was decided a few weeks after Underwood. The
panel, which appears to have been unaware of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Underwood, did not
mention the sovereign immunity issue. Instead, the LaDuke panel cited the D.C. Circuit's opinion
in A.S.H. and a concurring opinion in Blum v. Stenos to "support the position that the inordinate
risk of no fee award was sufficient to justify a multiplier." Id. Unlike the Ninth Circuit panel in
Underwood, the LaDuke court undertook no independent analysis of the multiplier under the EAJ A.
See also Local 3-98, Intl Woodworkers of America v. Donovan, 580 F. Supp. 719, 717 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
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use of multipliers in calculating fees, yet to permit the factors determining multipliers
to be used to justify exceptions to the $75 per hour limit. 185
Moreover, the two appellate decisions, aside from their internal inconsistencies,
ignore the letter and spirit of the EAJA. First, they eviscerate the effort to distinguish
the EAJA from other fee awards. If the factors which permit multipliers — contingency,
quality, result — justify fees above $75 per hour, then fees can be awarded in EAJA
cases on the same basis as in any other award. While the D.C. Circuit may limit hourly
fees to market rates below $75 per hour, lodestar adjustments may be used to multiply
the fees to accommodate nonmarket factors. While the Ninth Circuit may prohibit
multipliers, hourly rates may produce the same award on the same ground used to
justify multipliers. Moreover, the construction of the statutory exception will differ for
each circuit. If fees above $75 per hour depend on the Cope/and factors in the D.C.
Circuit, they should turn on the Lindy analysis in the Third Circuit, the Johnson factors
in the Fifth Circuit and the ABA standards in the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the interpre-
tation of a national statute intended to influence federal action will depend more on
geography than congressional intent. Under this type of analysis, the legislation's unique
effort to cap fees would become no more than an exhortation to observe fee guidelines
already in place.
Second, the individual factors identified in A.S.H. and Underwood violate the express
statutory language requiring the award of prevailing market rates. The committee re-
ports explain that fees are to be set in accordance with prevailing market rates "without
reference to the fee arrangement between attorney and client." 186 Even the statutory
exception permitting fees greater than $75 per hour requires awards to be calculated
solely on the basis of prevailing market rates. 387 Conversely, the purpose of many of the
Kerr and Copeland factors is to adjust hourly rates to compensate for factors not reflected
in prevailing market rates)" The quality factor has been defined to reward quality above
that to be expected from an attorney commanding the market rate awarded; contingency
turns on the risk borne by the attorney in accordance with the particular attorney-client
arrangement. The legislative history of the EAJA precludes higher fees based on "ex-
pertise of counsel" alone. 189 Thus, the EAJA's emphasis on prevailing market rates, 19°
185 The district court based the hourly rates awarded on plaintiffs' affidavits establishing the
noncontingent rates paid lawyers in corporate law firms with educational backgrounds similar to
that of plaintiffs' counsel.
186 H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 15.
187 The statute, in providing that the "amount of fees shall he based upon prevailing market
rates ... , except that ... attorneys' fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the
court determines that an increase in the cost of' living or a special factor ... justifies a higher fee,"
creates an exception to the $75 per hour maximum, not an exception to the more general rule
requiring fees to be set in accordance with prevailing market rates. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982).
188 The Copeland factors cited in A.S.H. are the factors justifying multipliers, viz., contingency,
quality and delay. See supra note 179. The Underwood court failed to identify which of the Kerr
factors mentioned — novelty and difficulty of the issues, the contingent nature of the fee, undesir-
ability of the case, the expertise of counsel, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the
customary fees and awards in other cases — justified an exception to the $75 per hour fee cap. See
supra note 183. The contingency of the fee, the undesirability of the case, and results obtained have
generally been treated as the justifications for multipliers. See infra note 255.
188 See supra note 174.
' 9° Of course, the courts have not yet settled the question whether a multiplier can ever be
considered part of "prevailing market rates." In Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), the
Supreme Court characterized the issue presented as "whether, and under what circumstances, an
upward adjustment of an award based on prevailing market rates is appropriate under § 1988." Id.
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drafted during a period when the Kerr and Copeland factors were well established, is
inconsistent with the A.S.H. and Underwood courts' justifications for their awards of
attorneys' fees. 191
Finally, in addition to inconsistencies with the statute, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits'
emphasis on contingency, quality, and result creates its own anomalies. Contingency
bonuses, by definition, reserve the highest fees for those cases in which the prospects
for success are weakest. This necessarily means that the highest bonuses will be assessed
against the losing parties with the relatively strongest cases; the opponent who loses after
a hard fight where the complexity of the litigation, the uncertainty as to the facts and
the unsettled nature of the law make the defense entirely reasonable. Conversely, Con-
gress intended the EAJA to apply only to cases of "unreasonable governmental action";
the statute denies fees altogether in genuinely close, complicated cases where the unsuc-
cessful government position is "substantially justified." The effect of a rule permitting
the award of higher fees in contingent EAJA cases is therefore to reserve the highest
fees for those cases where the government position is almost, but not quite, substantially
justified. The result is clearly at odds with the statutory priority of deterring the least
meritorious government cases, 192 Thus, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have merged the
standards used to determine lodestar adjustments with the special factors necessary to
permit awards above $75 per hour only by ignoring the distinctive nature of the EAJA.
The better analysis is to interpret the EAJA exception to the $75 per hour fee cap
on its own terms, within the context of this statute's purposes and concerns. The contin-
gent nature of the representation should justify higher fees where the court finds that
at 1544. The Court characterized the lodestar determination as the market rate calculus: multipliers
are used to correct market rates for other factors. Id. at 1594, 1547. Justice Brennan's concurrence
in that case, however, argued that contingency increases, if not other adjustments, are "entirely
consistent with the market based approach to hourly rates that is today affirmed by the Court" Id.
at 1551 (Brennan, J., concurring). But Justice Brennan also emphasized that "lclontingency ad-
justments ... should not be confused with contingency fee arrangements that are commonly entered
into by private attorneys representing plaintiffs in civil litigation." Id. at 1551 n.* (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Since the market allows for contingent representation only through percentage of recovery
fees, the courts in referring to "prevailing market rates" have used the term to describe noncontin-
gent hourly rates. The EAJA, with its emphasis on "actual time expended" and dollars per hour
almost certainly envisions a noncontingent hourly calculation.
191 Congressman Kastenmeier, one of the sponsors of the legislation, acknowledged:
In conclusion, 1 would like to emphasize that this hill does not alter the standards and
methods of determining attorneys' fees under existing law, wherein attorneys' fees can
be awarded. For example, the $75 general citing in the bill for attorneys' fees should
not be considered a maximum in other existing attorneys' fees statutes, such as those
under the civil rights laws. Important public policies are served by the private enforce-
ment of such laws, and reimbursement is not the main issue. Courts have considered
other factors in such cases, and should continue to do so.
Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at 413. Congressman
Kastenmeier clearly distinguished other statutes, where "reimbursement is not the main issue" and
where the courts properly "have considered other factors." Id.
'92 See supra note 154. It is also anomalous to recognize an exception for large recoveries given
Congress's assumption that the act was most needed in cases where the claim was too small to justify
the fees charged or to support a contingent fee arrangement. See supra note 153. Conversely, it
would be consistent with the purposes of the act and the factors specified to permit increases for
inflation or delay in payment. Similarly, no statutory purpose can be served by preventing a litigant
from recovering his full expenses for hiring the best qualified attorney in the area while rewarding
a less qualified attorney who performed above expectations.
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a particular client could secure representation only on a contingent basis, and that such
representation was available for that particular case only at fees exceeding $75 per hour.
The court should then award not a multiplier, 195 but the minimum hourly fee necessary
to attract competent counsel on a contingent hasis. 194 Such an analysis would also pre-
clude higher fees for extraordinary performance, but would endorse such fees if needed
to retain counsel with special expertise essential to an unusually complicated or arcane
claim. In such cases, the EAJA would permit the award to reflect market rates for such
a specialty, 395 while still precluding the adjustment of market rates to compensate for
nonmarket factors. 196
To date, however, the courts seem more determined to fit EAJA cases within the
confines of traditional fee doctrine than to deal with the statute on its own terms. 197
Close examination of two recent district court opinions, illustrating almost dramatically
opposed approaches to statutory construction, will demonstrate the difficulties the courts
are experiencing in deciding EAJA cases within the traditional framework established
by their respective circuits.
193 As noted above, the exception authorizing fees above $75 per hour permits the awards of
prevailing market rates above $75 per hour. See supra note 187. Multipliers do not express prevailing
market rates. See supra note 190.
'" Such a rule would not necessarily conflict with the requirement that prevailing rates be set
without reference to "the particular attorney-client arrangement," since rates would be set with
reference to the circumstances of a particular client, but not necessarily with reference to the
particular arrangement he secured with his attorney. Since the determination of hourly rates would
reflect risk, however, it would still result in the highest fees being awarded in the cases in which
the government position was the least unreasonable. It would also mean that the courts could
compensate the attorneys' risk of nonpayment but not the client's risk of nonreimbursement. See
supra note 155.
195 An interesting question is whether the EAJA would ever permit higher fees because no
attorney in a particular locality is available at $75 per hour. Cf supra note 174. Presumably it would
if the prevailing party could establish that a local attorney was necessary to fair representation or
an out-of-town attorney's travel expenses would make such representation more expensive. If a
specialty justifies fees above $75 per hour, e.g., patent expertise, the question also arises whether
the rate should be that for a lawyer in a locality charging high rates, e.g., New York, or for patent
lawyers generally. It is anomalous to restrict a skilled New York litigator to fees of $75 per hour
while permitting a patent attorney to recover fees of $200 per hour, The test ought still to be the
minimum hourly rate necessary to attract an attorney qualified to handle the particular proceeding,
not the customary fee for New York patent attorneys. Similarly, increases to the $75 per hour rate
justified by inflation should be on a national, not a local basis.
In Local 3-98, Intl Woodworkers of America v. Donovan, 580 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Cal.
1984), the court justified an award of fees above $75 per hour on the grounds that counsels'
expertise made them more efficient. According to the court, inexperienced counsel would have
spent more hours to accomplish the same result. Id. While this analysis is facially appealing, it is in
reality no different from the award of higher rates on the basis of any other expertise and it should
be subject to the same analysis.
197 Although the wholesale incorporation of the Kerr and Copeland factors into the standards
used to determine exceptions to the $75 per hour fee cap seems to invite large awards, the results
to date have been circumspect. The A.S.H. court awarded, "[On view of the long delay . . , inflation,
the quality of representation and the successful result," a relatively modest upward adjustment of
10%. 724 F.2d at 219-20. In Underwood, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the multiplier of 3.5, while
affirming the award of rates from $80 to $120 per hour. 761 F.2(1 at 1348. In Battles Farm Co. v.
Pierce, No. 76-393 (D.D.C. April 25, 1985), an operating subsidy case related to Underwood, the
district applied the Blum standards finding that plaintiffs had failed to justify a multiplier, but
permitted fees of $85 per hour to compensate for inflation after 1981. See infra note 256.
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III. UNDERWOOD AND DUBOSE: STUDIES IN CONTRAST IN THE CALCULATION OF EAJA
FEES
Although implementation of the EAJA has inspired extensive litigation over the
statute's eligibility requirements,'" the early fee awards have been calculated conserva-
tively, postponing resolution of the potential calculation controversies.'" The courts, in
piecemeal fashion, are beginning to address these issues, but to date they have done so
without a systematic examination of the statute's purposes or the larger issues concerning
fee calculation. 200 The case of Underwood v. Pierce manages — though more because of
1" Indeed, interpretation of the eligibility requirements has produced at least one split in the
circuits. In defining the statutory term "position of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), five
circuits have ruled that only the government's litigation position must be substantially justified to
preclude fees. Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1984); Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d
539 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1982); Operating Eng'rs
Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486 (D. Utah 1982), aff 'd, 737 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1984).
See also S Sc H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 672 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1982). The Third and
Ninth Circuits have ruled, however, that a prevailing party may be eligible for fees if the government
position underlying the litigation is not substantially justified. Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1 192
(9th Cir. 1984); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 703
F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983); Moats v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1537 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Congress
resolved the split in favor of requiring both positions to be substantially justified. See Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 574 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)). See supra notes 146 and 148.
The courts have also split on the question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) permits the award
of attorneys' fees against the United States where 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would permit the award of fees
against state officials for analogous actions. See infra notes 283-306 and accompanying text.
In addition, the government has challenged, largely unsuccessfully, fee awards for work per-
formed before the effective date of the act. See, e.g., Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1291
(7th Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 703 F.2d
700, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1983); Kay Mfg. Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Tyler Business Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1982); but see Commissioners of
Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1982); Allen v. United States, 547 F.
Supp. 357, 360-62 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Rosenthal & Co., 537
F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
For the definition of "pending" under the statute, see, e.g., Commissioners of Highways v.
United States, 684 F.2d 443, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1982); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64, 67-68 (5th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Heydt v. Citizens
State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982). For an interpretation of "special circumstances which
make an award unjust," see, e.g., Matthew v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993, 1009 (M.D. Ga.
1981).
19' The early cases involved relatively few fee calculation — as opposed to eligibility — contro-
versies, and none involved fees above $75 per hour. See, e.g., Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp.
1320, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Pomp, 538 F. Supp. 513, 515 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Photo
Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 353 (D.D.C. 1982); cf. Greater Los Angeles Council on
Deafness (GLAD) v. KCET, No. 78-4715R (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1982) (awarding fees of $175 per
hour and a multiplier of it without addressing EAJA issues) rev'd in part on other grounds, 719 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1982); see also infra note 200 and cases cited therein. In addition, because the early
EAJA cases have moved so slowly through the courts, it is still impossible to gauge the full extent
of federal liability. The Underwood fee litigation, for example, has been pending since shortly after
the EAJA became effective. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 146, at 8-9 (reporting that $3.899
million had been awarded as of October 1, 1984).
200 See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 703 F.2d 700 (3d
Cir. 1983); Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1984); Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937
(D. Conn. 1983), rev'd, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); Glick v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 567
F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. III. 1983).
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the lower court's obscurity than its insight — to bring together almost the full range of
EAJA calculation issues. The related Connecticut case of Dubose v. Pierce illustrates a
different view of the same issues. Although both opinions have been modified on appeal,
the uistrict court opinions continue to provide the most comprehensive treatment of the
fee calculation issues presented by the EAJA. Accordingly, the analysis in this portion
of the article will rest on the structure established by the district court awards in these
two cases. 20 '
A. The Factual Background
In the largest EAJA award to date, the district court in Underwood v. Pierce granted
$1.129 million in fees to the Western Center on Law and Poverty for its representation
of a nationwide class challenging the failure of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") to implement a housing subsidy program authorized by the
Housing and Community Development Act. 2" In a virtually identical case, the district
court in Dubose v. Pierce awarded $140,000 to legal services' attorneys for similar activi-
ties. 2" Both actions had been settled in 1979 with HUD making available a $60 million
fund to provide rent rebates for subsidized housing tenants. 2" The rent rebates were to
be administered by Price-Waterhouse, subject to the supervision of a committee of
counsel consisting of the two plaintiffs' counsel in Underwood, one of plaintiffs' counsel
in Dubose and two lawyers from private firms in Los A ngeles. 2"
20]
	 Underwood district court decision on fee eligibility is set forth at 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D.
Cal. 1982), and the fee award in an unpublished opinion, C.A. No. 79-1318—HP (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
1983). The Dubose decision is set forth in a single opinion, at 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983).
The two appellate decisions are reported in Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985);
Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985).
202 See supra note 201.
205
 See supra note 201.
201
	 v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff 'd in part, rend in part, 761 F.2d
1342 (9th Cir. 1985),
205 When the nationwide class in Underwood was certified, members of classes previously certified,
including the Dubose class, were excluded. See Dubose v. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582,584 n.8 (D. Conn.
1979). The settlement in both Underwood and Dubose had been entered at the time when a common
fund recovery offered the only possibility for fees and the parties expected the settlement distri-
bution to exhaust the fund. Deposition of James C. Sturdevant at 50-51, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F.
Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983). The legal services attorneys had insisted on barring fees which would
diminish their clients' recovery and opposed appointment of a special master whose fee would come
from the settlement fund. Memorandum of Underwood Plaintiffs Re: Status of Settlement at 20-21,
Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Instead, they volunteered to supervise
the distribution on a pro bono basis and agreed to the appointment of two private attorneys to the
Committee of Counsel on the condition that they serve without fee. Memorandum on Behalf of
Statewide Tenant Class Certified in Dubose v. Harris Re: Appointment of a Fourth Member to the
Committee of Counsel at 6-7, Dubose v. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582 (D. Conn. 1979). HUD maintained,
inter alia, that the Stipulation of Settlement, which provided that "[n]one of the sums distributed
may be used to pay attorneys' fees" and that "distribution of the settlement fund shall involve no
other substantial costs or expenditures by HUD," barred fees, at least for settlement administration.
Stipulation of Settlement, 11 1 13(f), 4(d), Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
In Underwood, plaintiffs requested fees only from the settlement fund, but the court sua sponte
awarded fees to be paid by HUD from other sources. Id. at 259. In Dubose, where the issue was
fully briefed, the court agreed with HUD that the Stipulation of Settlement barred fees for settle-
ment administration. 579 F. Supp. at 955.
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On behalf of Underwood plaintiffs, the Western Center on Law and Poverty claimed
compensation for 3672 hours, with approximately half of those hours devoted to settle-
ment activities ranging from court appearances to publicity campaigns. 206 Counsel estab-
lished prevailing community rates of up to $120 per hour by submitting affidavits from
attorneys with similar educational backgrounds who testified to their hourly rate for
traditional corporate practice in the Los Angeles area."' The Western Center then asked
for a multiplier of 4, arguing that, as legal services attorneys, their prospects for fees
were extraordinarily contingent, that the size of the $60 million fund justified a large
bonus, that inflation since the case was filed in 1976 diminished the value of the historical
rates they were requesting, and that the quality of the settlement distribution merited
higher fees."' To justify an exception to the $75 per hour limit on fees, counsel argued
that Iblecause indigents cannot pay their lawyers, in the ordinary course the pool of
attorneys available to assist indigents even with simple legal problems is extremely
limited."26° They therefore concluded that the availability of attorneys willing to repre-
sent indigent clients in a complex matter was nonexistent. 21°
The district court granted almost the entire request. It reduced the compensable
hours by 10% "[b]ecause Western Center's records are somewhat imprecise and because
it is necessary to adjust for time spent in lobbying activities and for other work not
directly related to this case." 2 " It accepted the historical rates of $80 to $120 per hour
which plaintiffs' counsel claimed based on their "experience and expertise and on pre-
vailing market rates." 212 The court then ruled that "[a] multiplier of 3.5 properly reflects
the contingent nature of this case, its complexity, and, most importantly, the high quality
of Western Center's work and the excellent results achieved." 2 ' 3 The Ninth Circuit,
without scrutinizing the district court's calculations, affirmed the lodestar, and the district
court finding that the "novelty and difficulty of the issues, the contingent nature of the
fee, the undesirability of the case, the expertise of counsel, the amount involved and the
2°'-' To document those hours, plaintiffs submitted (1) contemporaneous legal services times
sheets for 1978-1982; (2) legal services summaries for one attorney for 1977-1978 which identified
activities in general categories such as "research" or "conference"; and (3) an estimate that the other
attorney spent at least as much time as the first attorney during 1977-1978. Declaration of Mary
S. Burdick and exhibits, July 6,1982, Underwood v. Pierce, C.A. No. 79-1318–HP (C.D. Cal. Feb.
3, 1983).
2°7 Counsel submitted the Declaration of Jerome C. Byrne, establishing the hourly rate Under-
wood counsel would have commanded at the firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, and the Decla-
rations of Norman Davidson, III, Edmund J. Towle, III, John E. McDermott, III, and Charles F.
Palmer, establishing billing rates for private firms with largely corporate practices.
205 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees
to Western Center on Law and Poverty at 28-33, Underwood v. Pierce, C.A. No. 79-1318–HP
(C.D. Cal. Feb, 3, 1983).
2°2 Id. at 4.
21 ° In their reply brief, the Underwood plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to higher fees
because of their attorneys' "special qualifications" in "poverty law," and their "skill and patience" in
dealing with a "large and unresponsive bureaucracy." On appeal, plaintiffs also argued that, inde-
pendent of the availability of attorneys, the court could exceed the $75 per hour limit for "the same
special factors which justified a multiplier — contingency, exceptional quality of services, exceptional
result of the case, and difficulty of the case." Appellee's Brief at 38, Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d
1342 (9th Cir. 1985).
2" Underwood, C.A. No. 79-1318–HP, slip. op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983).
212 Id. at 4. The fees spanned the years 1976-82.
412 Id. at 8.
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results obtained, and the customary fees and awards in other cases" justified an exception
to the statute's $75 per hour fee cap. 2 " At the same time, the court of appeals vacated
the multiplier assigned by the district court on the grounds that the statute failed to
authorize such enhancements. 215
In Dubose v. Pierce, a statewide tenant class, certified before and excluded from the
nationwide Underwood class, had challenged HUD's failure to implement the housing
subsidy program in Connecticut. The Dubose case was settled in accordance with a
settlement identical in all important respects to the Underwood settlement and with the
understanding that the Underwood court would supervise the settlement distribution to
the Dubose class and that one of Dubose counsel would sit on the Underwood committee of
counse1. 216
The Dubose counsel initially requested fees from the Underwood court, but after that
court declined jurisdiction, these lawyers refiled in Connecticut requesting fees for over
four thousand hours of work, at hourly rates up to $150 per hour, with a multiplier of
two to three.211 The legal issues in the Underwood and Dubose cases were almost identical,
the type and range of activities in the two cases were comparable, and the background
and experience of the attorneys were similar. 2 t 9 Nonetheless, the district court in Dubose
awarded the attorneys in this case a much smaller fee. In addition to declining to award
a multiplier, the Connecticut court also found no basis for an exception to the $75 per
hour statutory maximum, awarded no compensation for settlement administration ac-
tivities, for defending the settlement against project owners, or for litigating the fee
issue, and otherwise reduced all reconstructed hours by ten percent. 212 The Second
Circuit reversed the district court award, finding plaintiffs ineligible for fees without
reviewing the lower court's calculations.22°
While neither the district court nor the appellate opinions in these two cases provide
models for fee resolution, the two lower court decisions squarely present the issues at
the heart of fee calculation under the EAJA. 221
2 ' 4
 761 F.2d at 1347.
215 Id. at 1348.
2 ' 8 Dubose v. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582 (D. Conn. 1979).
217 Order Denying Motions for Award of Attorneys' Fees to James C. Sturdevant and San
Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services as Attorneys for Dubose v. Pierce, November 29,
1982, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983).
2 ' 8 Compare Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982), and Underwood v. Pierce,
C.A. No. 79-1318—HP (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983), with Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn.
1983); see supra note 201.
219 Dubose, 579 F. Supp. at 957.
220 The Second Circuit also reversed the district court's finding that the position of the United
States was substantially justified. Dubose, 761 F.2d at 917. HUD's appeal primarily concerned fee
eligibility rather than fee calculation, though HUD did challenge the award of fees for minis briefs
and other activities in actions not under the jurisdiction of the court. See Opening Brief for
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985). The cross-appeal chal-
lenged the lower court's decision not to award a lodestar adjustment, the failure to award fees for
settlement administration and the disallowance of fees for work on the fee motion.
22 ' A third operating subsidy case, Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, No. 76-393 (D.D.C. April 25,
1985), is also the subject of a fee dispute. In a preliminary opinion, the court has indicated that it
will award fees of $85 per hour justified by inflation since 1981, but no multiplier on the grounds
that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden established by Blum.
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B. The Issues in Controversy
1. Compensable Hours
The overriding statutory question in determining compensable hours in Underwood
was whether fees were to be restricted to those activities necessary for the litigation or
extended to all activities advancing the prevailing parties' interestS. The operating subsidy
cases presented that issue in all its many facets because plaintiffs' counsel volunteered
to play a role far beyond the adversarial one common in antitrust or civil rights settle-
ments. 222 Unlike other committees of counsel, the Underwood committee not only moni-
tored the settlement, it also administered it. 223 It did not limit its participation to that
necessary to protect clients' interests; the lawyers sat on appeals boards reviewing tenants'
claims, decided project owners' rebate challenges, argued in favor of the eligibility of
nonclient tenants, and conducted publicity campaigns directed to clients and nonclients
alike.224 In pursuing these activities, counsel acted as accountants, public relations spe-
cialists, investment counselors and, to a smaller extent, secretaries and messengers. In
short, the committee of counsel performed an administrative role ordinarily reserved to
special masters — or to the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). 225
If Underwood were a civil rights suit, plaintiffs could argue that such activities con-
tributed to the statutory purpose of promoting civil rights and that the only issue, if any,
should be one of valuation. In a common fund case, the test would be the benefit
accruing to the client as a result of such services. 225 The purposes EAJA awards are
intended to serve, however, are different from those of civil rights or common fund
awards. Moreover, to advance these purposes, Congress enacted statutory guidelines for
EAJA fee calculation missing from other fee shifting statutes. First, the Act restricts fees
to prevailing parties, not their attorneys. 227 The district court in Underwood recognized
that its jurisdiction was limited to the parties before it, and precluded awards to com-
222 Cf. Munsy Trust v. Sycor, 457 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fee treatment of settlement
work); City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, 440 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fee treatment of
settlement work); Berger v. CPC International, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fee treatment
of settlement work); Barnett v. Pritzer, 73 F.R.D. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fee treatment of settlement
work); Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (fee treatment of settle-
ment work).
222 See generally Stipulation of Settlement, Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
224 See HUD Appellant's Brief at 36-37, Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985);
Declaration of Mary S. Burdick and Patricia M. Tenoso, Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342 (9th
Cir. 1985) (filed July 6, 1982 in support of the fee award) (time records attached to Declaration).
222 The settlement, after all, involved the retroactive implementation of a program which would
ordinarily have been administered by HUD. The Underwood court did consider appointment of a
special master, but rejected it in part because of Underwood counsel's argument that the "members
of the Committee of Counsel, whose efforts would in large part be taken over by a special master,
are all serving without fee." Memorandum of Underwood Plaintiffs Re: Status of Settlement,
Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
226 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). Plaintiffs' attorneys in both cases argued that their
activities were increased by HUD's failure to fulfill its obligations under settlement. HUD denied
the allegations and they do not appear to be a basis for either court's decision.
888	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:843
mittee of counsel members representing nonparty beneficiaries.228 The court, however,
did not extend the same analysis to Underwood counsel. It drew no distinction between
work performed directly on behalf of the Underwood class and work either adverse to
the interests of individual class members 229 or benefiting other classes, such as those
certified in Dubose."° Even if the court regarded the settlement work as generally ben-
efiting the class, that conclusion would not justify the award of compensation for those
segregable activities which a paying client would disavow. 231
Second, the Act requires that compensable activities be "incurred ... by that party
in any civil action ... in any court having jurisdiction of that action," The Underwood
plaintiffs claimed compensation for time spent lobbying Congress, HUD and other
federal agencies, for presenting amicus briefs before other courts, publicity efforts
throughout the country, and settlement administration generally. 232 Dubose counsel fur-
ther sought fees for assisting counsel in other cases and conducting pilot projects in
Albuquerque, New Mexico and Peoria, Illinois. 233 The district court in Underwood re-
duced the hours claimed by counsel by ten percent to account, for example, "for time
spent in lobbying activities and for other work not directly related to the instant case,"
without identifying .what work other than lobbying it had in mind or mentioning the
statutory language. 234 On the other hand, the district court in Dubose, acknowledging the
statutory restrictions, disallowed fees for lobbying because it found that such fees, even
if related to the operating subsidy litigation, were not "incurred in a civil action." 233
 The
Dubose court, however, then permitted fees for presenting amicus briefs before other
courts, finding that "the briefs were reasonably necessary to protect the interests of
22g Order Denying Motions for Award of Attorneys Fees to James Sturdevant and San Fernando
Valley Neighborhood Legal Services as Attorneys fir Dubose v. Pierce at 1, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F.
Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983). The member of the Committee of Counsel appointed because of his
representation of the Dubose class filed for fees initially before the Underwood court, arguing that
since the Underwood court had supervised the settlement, it was best qualified to evaluate counsel's
performance. In declining to award fees, the Underwood court emphasized that the Dubose class had
never become a party to the Underwood action.
The Dubose court, by ruling that the Stipulation of Settlement barred fees for settlement
administration, never reached the issue of the compensability of Dubose counsel's activities, which
did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Dubose court to award fees for activities supervised by the
Underwood court because the Dubose court retained at least some jurisdiction over the activities
directly affecting the Dubose class.
222 Underwood counsel, as members of the Committee of Counsel, served on an appeal board
ruling on, and sometimes denying, tenant claims. It is difficult to imagine paying clients agreeing
to compensate their counsel for ruling against them. Even if the EAJA did not otherwise limit fees,
the Hensley ruling would preclude charging HUD for fees which a paying client would find unrea-
sonable. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
2" At the time of settlement, the parties incorrectly believed that eligible claims would more
than exhaust the settlement fund. Deposition of James C. Sturdevant at 50-51, Dubose v, Pierce,
579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983). Accordingly, activities on behalf of eligible claimants outside the
class were arguably in conflict with the interests of class members. See Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motions for Awards of Attorneys' Fees, Part II, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983).
2" See supra note 92; infra note 243.
"2 See supra note 206.
233
	 of James C. Sturdevant in Support of His Motion and Supplemental Motions
for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Exhibit A, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1983).
239
	 No. 79-1318—HP, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983). The court also indicated that
the ten percent reduction was to account for the questionable documentation provided.
235 579 F. Supp. at 956 (quoting the EAJA).
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plaintiffs in this action and, as such, they were reasonably incurred in pursuing litigation
before this court." 236 The court thus inappropriately dispensed with the requirement
that the court awarding the compensation have jurisdiction over the activities compen-
sated.
In applying the "fees incurred" language, however, neither court decided a third
issue: how strictly the EAJA limits fees to those necessary to the litigation. 237 Settlement
administration involved activities which were not the work of lawyers, 238 not directed
against HUD, 259 not adversarial at al1, 24° or not before the court. 24 ' While these activities
advanced the settlement, they were "unnecessary to the litigation."242 A narrow reading
236 Id. at 958. Cf. Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, No. 76-393 (D.D.C. April 25, 1985), in which the
court commented, "11 plaintiffs' attorneys contributed to the success in Underwood, they should have
been reimbursed in the Underwood case." Id., slip op. at 10. The legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend the EAJA to "provide funds for intervenors, friends of the court or others
who have not been injured or are likely to suffer irreparable harm." H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra
note 153, at 9. Cf. Comment, Adjusting Attorney Fee Awards, supra note 67, at 809 ("Time spent
working on other cases or even lobbying Congress is compensable if it issues to the benefit of the
class.").
237 The Act limits reimbursable costs to those reasonably "incurred in adequately preparing
and prosecuting a case. This includes, but is not limited to, the reasonable fees for attorneys and
expert witnesses, and the cost of reports, studies or tests reasonably needed to support the private
party's case." H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 153, at 11. Arguably, therefore, the test of reasonable
fees is the same test applied to reimbursable costs; viz., those fees necessary for adequately preparing
and prosecuting a case. See also supra note 163.
238 For example, the hours plaintiffs claimed for publicity campaigns, media training, and
designing claims forms were largely administrative activities unrelated to the litigation. See supra
note 206. Of course, such activities may not be compensable in any event. The courts have counselled
that:
attorney's fees may be awarded for the performance of professional duties only and
should not be awarded for the execution of duties more properly performed by
persons other than attorneys such as trustees or receivers. ... [J]f such awards are
made, attorneys would be encouraged to perform nonprofessional duties in order to
increase the size of the fee award.
In re Anthracite Litigation, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 62,437 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, sub ?WM. Colonial Fuel Co. v. Blue Coal Corp., 612 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1979). See
also In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,798, at 78,266
(D. Ariz. 1980).
239 Although there is no question that Underwood and Dubose were civil actions brought against
the United States, plaintiffs' counsel sought compensation for time spent opposing motions by
intervenors, quarreling among themselves and resolving other disputes in which HUD took no part.
See supra note 206. The time spent on internecine quarrels could be dismissed as unproductive and
other courts have discounted time spent on issues in which plaintiffs did not prevail against the fee
paying party. See, e.g., Firebird Soc'y v. Members of Bd. of Fire Comtn'rs, 556 F.2d 642, 644 (2d
Cir. 1977). Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
24° Once the settlement occurred, both parties and the court shared the same interest — to
effectuate the agreement. or the thousands of hours spent on settlement activities, few were spent
on matters in dispute between the parties. In conducting publicity campaigns or pilot projects, for
example, plaintiff's counsel participated in activities both parties agreed should be undertaken with
few disputes as to the details. See HUD Post-Hearing Brief, Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F. Supp. 937 (D.
Conn. 1983).
241 The activities took place "in a civil action" in the sense that the Committee of Counsel
submitted applications to the Underwood court detailing all expenses, bills and other settlement
activities. The court signed them without review unless HUD objected. See id.
242 The alternative procedure would have been to have HUD program officials, who are paid
government salaries, or a special master paid from the settlement fund, perform the administrative
890	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:843
of the Act would find such activities unrelated to congressional concern that plaintiffs
be able to afford their day in court; an expansive view would treat the EAJA on a par
with civil rights legislation designed to vindicate plaintiffs' broader interests. The EAJA's
"fees incurred" language and the limited statutory purpose of the Act suggest that the
Underwood fees should have been more closely scrutinized. At the very least, the district
court should have refused to compensate activities which a paying client would have
disallowed. 243
Fourth, in requiring that the party seeking fees "submit ... an application which
shows ... the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney .
stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed," the EAJA imposes a requirement for detailed documentation exceeding that
of other fee shifting statutes. 244 While the courts have not interpreted that provision to
bar reconstructed records, 245 the Dubose court reduced by ten percent the otherwise
compensable fees claimed and barred all time for work on fee motions because the use
of reconstructed records had substantially increased the argument, and the level of
confusion on their motions. 246 In Underwood, one of plaintiffs' attorneys had simply
estimated that, for a two year period, her hours were equal to that of the other attorney
on the case. 247 The court also reduced these hours by ten percent, but did so to account
not only for the difficulties in documentation, but challenges to compensability as we11.248
If the statutory requirement of an "itemized statement" showing "the actual time ex-
pended" is to have meaning, it must be interpreted, at the very least, to disallow estimates
rejected in other fee litigation. 249 Yet, here again, the courts decided the issue without
addressing the statutory language. The rigorous analysis required by the EAJA would
bar "estimates" and would recognize only itemized reconstructions of the "actual time
expended."
Although the district courts in Underwood and Dubose reached different conclusions
about the compensability of counsel's activities, they did so without linking their conclu-
activities. Plaintiffs' lawyers performed these tasks because the legal services attorneys were in a
position to volunteer their time and both parties were convinced that this provided the least
expensive alternative. See supra note 205. The availability of attorneys' fees for the settlement
activities was not essential to plaintiffs' ability to pursue the litigation or to vindicate their rights.
Indeed, had plaintiffs been paying their attorneys it is questionable that they would have agreed
to such high priced performance of administrative activities. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424 (1983).
24 ' The Underwood court's ten percent across the board reduction made it impossible to tell
which activities the court compensated. While such an across the board reduction may be appro-
priate to deal with claims of excessive time spent or inadequate documentation, it frustrates itemized
review of the fee eligibility of particular activities.
2" 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)( I )(Pi) (1982) (emphasis added).
2" See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
2 ' 6 579 F. Supp. at 957.
247 See supra note 206. Although there was little real dispute as to whether the attorney spent
the time claimed, there was no way to determine the compensability of those hours particularly
since the other attorneys' time was set forth in broad categories which frustrated effective review.
For non-EAJA cases rejecting "mere citing of hours" or "casual after the fact estimates," see National
Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lindy
1, 487 F.2d at 167; Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 406
F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Colo. 1976).
2" See supra notes 234 and 243.
21" Cl. supra note 247 and cases cited therein.
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sions to the EAJA's specific requirements or limited purposes. The Act's express provi-
sions, along with its legislative history, require at least a more rigorous application of
existing principles, coupled with an insistence that fees be incurred by prevailing parties,
for activities necessary to the instant litigation, and that the hours claimed be appropri-
ately documented. 25° The district court's opinion in Dubose, which acknowledged the
limiting statutory language and scrutinized counsel's claims, made some effort in that
direction; the two Underwood opinions gave no recognition that the EAJA differed from
any other fee shifting statute.
2. Hourly Rates
Central to the EAJA's fee restrictions is the limitation of hourly rates to $75 per
hour "unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies
a higher fee." 251 The sharpest differences between the Underwood and Dubose district
court decisions concerned these courts' treatment of the EAJA's exceptions to the $75
per hour maximum rate. While the district court in Underwood expanded the exceptions
to all but eliminate the rule, the lower court in Dubose narrowly circumscribed application
of the exceptions.
In Underwood, the district court justified fees of up to $120 per hour and a multiplier
of 3.5 with the cursory observation that "Mew attorneys possess the special skills and
qualifications needed to handle successfully the litigation and settlement activities re-
quired by the case" and concluded that "[o]ther special factors justify a fee award in
excess of $75 per hour." 252 In discussing "other special factors," the district court assumed
that Congress intended the phrase to include all factors ordinarily considered in setting
fees.253 The court listed the Kerr factors, 254 adopted by the Ninth Circuit from Johnson v.
25° Many of the same issues arise in non-EAJA cases without specific statutory direction for
resolution. See, e.g., supra note 82 and cases cited therein (limiting the use of reconstructed records
and estimated hours). Nonetheless, the specific statutory language set forth above requires a deter-
mination within the context of the EAJA as a matter of statutory construction.
251 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982).
252 C.A. No. 79–I318--HP, slip. op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983).
"3 Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the term "special factors" is a term of art referring to the
so-called "Johnson" or "Kerr" factors. Their argument is unpersuasive. First, the term "special factors"
is too general a term to be treated as a term of art without some specific indication of congressional
intent.
Second, the Johnson or Kerr guidelines — or for that matter the Cope/and or Lindy guidelines
— are not referred to as "special factors" sufficiently often or uniformly to be treated as a term of
art. Indeed, the tact that they vary from circuit to circuit undercuts such treatment.
Third, the statutory formulation, referring to "special factors, such as limited availability of
qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved," suggests that the relevant factors are to he of a
kind like the "limited availability of qualified attorneys." See, e.g., United States v. Phillipp Overseas,
Inc. , 651 F.2d 747, 751 (C.C.P,A. 1981), applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to statutory
construction.
Fourth, the proposed construction would frustrate the congressional efforts to restrain fees
without advancing the congressional interest in enhancing access to the courts. See supra notes 172-
75 and accompanying text.
254 See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text. See also Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Kerr factors are:
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Georgia Highway Express, and applied them without further reference to the EAJA.255
The Kerr-Johnson factors, unlike the Copeland-Lindy-Grinnell factors, do not distin-
guish between the lodestar and the multiplier, and the Underwood court did not identify
which of the twelve factors justified fees above $75 per hour, which justified the hours
compensated, or which justified compensation at a basic hourly rate. 256
In contrast, the district court in Dubose limited its deliberations to the statutorily
specified exceptions of increases in the cost of living and the availability of qualified
counsel, finding that neither justified an exception to the fee cap. 257
 Although the court
did not specifically reach the issue of whether other "special factors" might justify higher
rates, its consistently narrow construction of the act suggests that it would have rejected
the wholesale incorporation of the Grinnell factors.258
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
526 F.2d at 70.
25 ' Underwood, C.A. No. 79-1318—HP, slip. op. at 2-4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983). Examination of
the individual factors the district court considered demonstrates no sensitivity to EAJA concerns.
First, the court considered the novelty and difficulty of the issues. The Supreme Court ruled in
mum that since this factor influences the hours compensated, it does not justify lodestar enhance-
ments. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. The same reasoning should preclude use of this
provision to justify fees above $75 per hour unless tied to a demonstration that unusual expertise
was required. See infra note 262. Second, the court cited the "contingent nature of the fee and the
undesirability of the case." observing that "when this case was filed, a fee award ... was speculative
and contingent" and concluding that because of the poor fee prospects and the time needed to
complete the case "most lawyers would view this case as undesirable." Underwood, slip op. at 3-4.
The district court analysis applies to every case filed by indigents; the EAJA, with its $75 per hour
fee cap, was intended to remedy the problem. The court failed to explain why plaintiffs' indigency
compelled fees above $75 per hour. See infra note 259. Third, the court mentioned the work and
ability of counsel, the amount involved, and the results obtained. Slip op. at 9. All three factors go
to the hours compensated, and to a lesser extent to the prevailing hourly rates. None justify
enhancements to the lodestar, see Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1548-50 (discussed supra notes 129-37 and
accompanying text), and none in itself justifies an exception to the $75 per hour limit. Finally, the
court considered the customary fees and awards in other cases to establish prevailing market rates.
Underwood, slip op. at 4.
256 Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, No. 76-393 (D.D.C. April 25, 1985), another related operating
subsidy case. Here, the court, citing Blum, held, "friesults obtained and the quality of representation,
like the novelty and complexity of the issues, will generally be subsumed within other factors used
to calculate a reasonable fee and will not normally 'provide an independent basis for increasing the
fee award.'" Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984)). The Battles Farm court accordingly
failed to award a lodestar adjustment while permitting fees of $85 per hour justified by inflation
since 1981.
257 579 F. Supp. at 953, 958. The Dubose court concluded that "[s)ince fees are sought almost
entirely for work done before the Act's effective date, it would be illogical to award a higher rate
based on an increase in the cost of living." Id. at 958. Accord, A.S.H., 724 F.2d at 218.
25s Dubose court characterized the Underwood opinion as finding an exception based on the
scarcity of counsel, and it stated that Dubose's counsel did not raise any other "special factors," so
it did not specifically reach the issue of whether the Johnson or Ken, factors could be considered.
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Even in applying the statutorily specified provision for a scarcity of qualified counsel,
however, the district courts in Underwood and Dubose demonstrated dramatically different
approaches. In finding a limited availability of counsel, the Underwood court observed
that "[flew attorneys possess the special skills or qualifications needed to handle success-
fully the litigation and settlement activities required by this case," 259 In sharp contrast,
the district judge in Dubose concluded:
I interpret the exception for "the limited availability of qualified attorneys"
to apply only when the party, because of such limited availability, has actually
paid in excess of $75 per hour. Accordingly the exception does not apply
here, where the clients are non-fee paying.260
Unlike the Underwood district court opinion, which makes no effort to assess the effect
of the $75 per hour limit on access to the courts, the Lower court's ruling in Dubose is
consistent with the congressional effort to limit the exception to those cases where the
fee cap would interfere with the statute's purposes. But such a construction still conflicts
with the congressional admonition that fees be set in accordance with prevailing market
rates irrespective of the "fee arrangement between attorney and client." 26 '
The better construction is to limit the exception to cases where the prevailing party
demonstrates that market rates for a particular proceeding preclude qualified, nonal-
truistic representation except at fees greater than $75 per hour. In a specialized antitrust
or patent proceeding, for example, a party prevailing against the United States should
be able to make such a showing, and the court could then award prevailing market rates
even to an attorney acting pro bono. To justify fees like those awarded in Underwood, a
court should have to find that the "special skills and qualifications" counsel possessed
579 F. Supp. at 953, 958. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that a multiplier was justified
even if authorized by statute. Id. at 952, 953.
26 The full statement of the Underwood court observed that:
The litigation was complex and protracted. Few attorneys possess the special skills and
qualifications needed to handle successfully the litigation and settlement activities
required by this case. Thus, a fee in excess of $75 per hour is justified.
C.A. No. 79-1318—HP, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983). The Underwood plaintiffs had argued
that they were entitled to higher fees because of their "special qualifications," principally in the area
of "poverty law," and their "skill" and "patience" in dealing with "a large and unresponsive bu-
reaucracy." See supra notes 208 and 210. Although they introduced affidavits from attorneys in
corporate practice commanding rates above $75 per hour, they made no effort to establish that
attorneys with their special skills and qualifications were unavailable except at such rates. Instead,
they tried to establish that there was a limited availability of attorneys willing to represent indigent
clients without fee. See supra note 207. The court of appeals noted these district court findings and
affirmed the hourly rates without analysis of the basis for the district court's conclusions. 761 F.2d
at 1347.
26" 579 F. Supp. at 958. Cf. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d
Cir. 1983).
26 ' H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 15. The Dubose limitation of the exception to cases
where the client has actually paid in excess of $75 per hour is analogous to the limitation of fee
awards to clients who have actually incurred fees. The courts have overwhelmingly ruled that
attorneys are entitled to prevailing market rates regardless of any fees their clients were actually
charged. See, e.g., Dubose, 579 F. Supp. at 947; San Filippo v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 564 F. Supp. 173, 174-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 376
(M.D. Pa. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 615,-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). Cf. Blum v.
Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
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were necessary to provide competent representation of their clients and unavailable to
parties able to pay $75 per hour. 262
Even the determination of necessary skills, however, would place the Underwood and
Dubose courts in conflict. Both cases raised the identical legal issue. Both cases were
decided on motions without a trial or extensive discovery and both cases were resolved
by the same settlement. 263 Yet, the Underwood court found the case "complex and pro-
tracted" requiring "special skills and qualifications" while the Dubose court concluded
that "the case presented a relatively simple question," that "HUD's unreasonable position
made this an easy case for plaintiffs," and that "an unusually high degree of legal talent
was not required."2"
These diametrically opposed factual conclusions cloak an issue of statutory construc-
tion: in an otherwise straightforward legal action, can a complicated settlement justify
an exception to the $75 per hour maximum? Implicitly, the Underwood court answered,
"yes." It characterized the case as a whole as "complex and protracted" by describing
the settlement activities alone. 265 The Dubose court reached the opposite conclusion. It
rejected the settlement as irrelevant, observing that "the settlement administration, even
if performed quite well, was not primarily the work of a lawyer." 266
Again, a court should instead ask whether adequate representation of the prevailing
party's interests required counsel with skills unavailable at $75 per hour. In Underwood
2"2 Alternatively, the court could have found that because Underwood plaintiffs were indigent,
they could secure only contingent representation and contingent representation was unavailable at
$75 per hour. The Underwood plaintiffs did not attempt to make either showing. The court in
A.S.H., 724 F.2d at 217-18, discussed this issue, stating that: "[t]he limited availability of counsel
provision is directed at another unusual situation: where specialized legal services cannot be obtained
in the market for $75 or less." The A.S.H. court then concluded that the appellant "does have
particular expertise in the area of smoking regulation; nevertheless a challenge of the [Civil Aero-
nautics Board] regulations as arbitrary and capricious did not necessarily require the service of
attorneys with [appellant's' subject matter expertise." Id. at 218.
26'
	 Underwood v. Hills, 414 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1976), and Underwood v. Pierce,
547 F. Stipp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982), with Dubose v. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582 (I). Conn. 1979).
264 Compare Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985), with Dubose, 579 F. Supp. at 953.
The Dubose court concluded that:
[t]his case presented a relatively simple question of whether HUD abused its discretion
in refusing to put a housing subsidy program into operation. HUD's unreasonable
position made this an easy case for plaintiffs, as evidenced by the unanimous rulings
of lower courts against HUD in suits across the country .... Because an unusually
high degree of legal talent was not required in this case, there was no dearth of lawyers
who could have achieved similar results.
Id. at 953 (citation omitted). Underwood was more complicated only in that it was a nationwide rather
than a statewide class action; it was easier in that it was filed later with more favorable precedent
in support of plaintiffs' position and decided within three months of filing on the basis of cross-
motions for summary judgment. Underwood v. Hills, 414 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1976).
2" In describing the complexity of the case, the court found that:
[title overall plan of administration required counsel to develop a unique formula for
distribution of funds, to create effective and fair claims processing procedures, to
institute complex fraud control systems, to launch an extensive media campaign to
locate class members, and to carry out other programs, all tailored especially to this
case.
C.A. No. 79-1318--HP, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983).
266 579  F. Supp. at 955. The settlement activities in the two cases were identical since the
Underwood Committee of Counsel, in which Dubose counsel participated, administered the settlement
for all eligible tenants. See supra note 205.
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and Dubose, vindication of plaintiffs' interests did not require that plaintiffs' attorneys
administer the settlement nor did the settlement require extraordinary legal talent. 267
Thus, the EAJA's purpose would not have been frustrated by observation of the $75
per hour limit.
In reviewing the hourly rates awarded in Underwood, a final statutory question
concerns the EAJA's admonition that the "amount of fees .. shall be based upon
prevailing market rate for the kind and quality of the services furnished . ."2" To
establish market rates, 269 the Underwood plaintiffs introduced affidavits testifying to the
prevailing rates for lawyers with their counsel's educational background engaged in
traditional corporate practice and then uniformly applied these rates to counsel's varied
settlement activities."° The Underwood plaintiffs successfully maintained that most attor-
neys charge a uniform rate for their services."' Defendants observed that no paying
client would have elected to have their attorneys, who had no experience in administering
complex settlements, perform such tasks at rates reflecting their litigation expertise.272
Given the fact that much of the work involved in Underwood would ordinarily have been
performed by a special master or by nonlawyers, the statute — and the market — should
have been interpreted to require a separate determination of prevailing rates for coun-
sel's settlement activities. 275
At the heart of the EAJA calculation of hourly rates is an effort to replicate prevailing
market rates. Neither the expansive award of the California court nor the more rigorous
calculations of the Connecticut court remained entirely true to the economic calculus
that the statute compels. Instead both decisions demonstrated the tendency of the courts
"2'7 Neither the Underwood court, see supra notes 259 and 265, nor the Underwood plaintiffs, see
supra note 210, were able to establish that the settlement required extraordinary legal skills. More-
over, even if it did, plaintiff's counsel claimed no experience in administering complex settlements.
Declarations of Mary S. Burdick and Patricia M. Tenoso, Underwood v. Pierce, C.A. No. 79-1318—
H P, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983). In contrast, the two members of the Committee of Counsel who could
claim such superior qualifications agreed to serve pro Bono. See Memorandum on Behalf of State-
wide Tenant Class Certified in Dubose v. Harris Re: Appointment of a Fourth Member to the
Committee of Counsel at 6-7, Dubose v. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582 (D. Conn. 1979),
268
	 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982) (emphasis added). The formulation appears to be taken
from the non-EAJA cases using an hours times hourly rates formula. Cf. Lindy /, 487 F.2d at 167;
Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 471.
2" See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
27" See supra notes 206 and 207 and accompanying text.
27 ' See supra notes 64, 72 and accompanying text. While most attorneys charge a uniform rate
for their services, there is a difference between the rates charged by senior lawyers from large law
firms who would restrict their activities to more complex legal tasks and equally experienced lawyers
from smaller practices who would undertake the full range of activities to be performed. The courts
have sometimes applied uniform hourly rates and sometimes differentiated the rates fir different
tasks, recognizing that uniform rates should reflect the different activities performed. Compare In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 591-93 (3d Cir. 1984); Brewster v. Dukakis, 544
F. Supp. 1069, 1076 (D. Mass. 1982); Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 485 F. Supp.
958, 962 (D. Conn. 1980), vacated and remanded, 638 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1980); Firebird Soc'y v.
Members of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 433 F. Supp. 752, 755-56 (ft C01111. 1976), aff 'd, 556 F.2d
642 (1977), all awarding different rates for different tasks, With Jacquette v. Black Hawk County,
Iowa, 710 F.2.ci 455, 457 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983); Blank v. Talley Industries, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), awarding uniform rates.
272 Brief for Appellant, Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985).
273 The Dubose court did not address this issue since it awarded no fees for settlement admin-
istration. Dubose, 579 F. Supp. at 955 (citing Dubose, 82 F.R.D. at 595).
896	 BOSTON COLI .FGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:843
to shape their construction of the EAJA in accordance with the different philosophies
of their respective circuits 274
3. The Multiplier
Only in addressing the issue of whether to apply a multiplier did the Underwood and
Dubose courts begin to grapple with the issues of statutory construction posed by the
EAJA — and in Underwood only on appeal. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California, without acknowledging the statutory issue, had awarded
the extraordinary multiplier of 3.5 with ritual reference to "the contingent nature of
this case, its complexity, and, most importantly, the high quality of the Western Center's
work and the excellent results achieved."275 The Ninth Circuit vacated this multiplier,
ruling that:
Two important distinctions set EAJA apart from all the statutes which Un-
derwood analogizes. The first is that EAJA alone places a specific dollar limit
on the hourly rate to be awarded. Because the statutory limit is so precise,
we refuse to inflate it by 350% without a stronger indication that Congress
intended for us to do so.
Second, unlike the statutes that Underwood uses to illustrate her point,
EAJA authorizes an award of fees against the United States. We must con-
sider carefully the scope of the government's waiver of its sovereign immu-
nity. We cannot order an award that has not been "specifically and unequiv-
ocally authorized by Congress." There is insufficient indication that Congress
intended to expose the United States to compounds of the hourly rate. We
therefore hold that a multiplier may not be applied to fees awarded under
the EAJA. 276
But in the same opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld fees above $75 per hour on the basis
of "the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the contingent nature of the fee, the undesirability of
the case, the expertise of counsel, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the
customary fees and awards in other cases."277 Thus, the court of appeals managed in a
single opinion to say both that the EAJA prohibited use of multipliers to increase hourly
rates and that hourly rates could be increased to compensate for the same factors
justifying multipliers. 278
274 The differences between Dubose and Underwood can be explained in part by the fact that
their respective circuits represent polar extremes in fee calculation. The Second Circuit has been
among the strictest of the circuits in awarding attorneys' fees, closely reviewing district court awards,
requiring detailed articulation of the basis for the fees awarded, and restraining the size of lodestar
adjustments, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
has been far more liberal, exercising less scrutiny over the lower courts and combining thefohmon
and Lindy guidelines in a more flexible manner. See supra note 79.
275 761 F.2d at 1347-48 (quoting Underwood v. Pierce, C.A. No. 79-1318—HP (C.D. Cal. Feb.
3, 1983)).
276 Id. at 1348 (citation omitted).
2" Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
278 Id. at 1347-48. The Underwood district court opinion does not appear to reach this result.
It based the hourly fees on a determination of prevailing market rates. Underwood v. Pierce. C.A.
No. 79-1318—HP, slip op. at 6, 8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1983).
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The district court in Dubose adopted a very different approach. Without reaching
the question of whether a multiplier could ever be awarded under the EAJA, 279 the
Connecticut court concluded that "[Once HUD's position was not substantially justified,
there was no great risk of failure."28° The ruling suggests that it would be difficult ever
to justify a multiplier under the EAJA since fees can be awarded only when the govern-
ment's position is not "substantially justified." The district court also ruled that counsel's
performance was not so extraordinary as to justify a multiplier without considering the
standard to be applied under the EAJA.281
While the Ninth Circuit opinion in Underwood and the district court opinion in
Dubose acknowledge the statutory difficulties that multipliers pose, neither completes the
analysis. For both the availability of multipliers and their method of calculation — both
their procedure and substance — turn on issues of statutory construction. The EAJA
mandates use of prevailing market rates; to the extent multipliers compensate for flaws
in market calculations, they conflict with the statutorily prescribed methodology. If fee
enhancement can be expressed as market adjustments, for example, used to translate a
noncontingent hourly rate into a market rate for contingent services, then the issue
becomes whether the statute permits differential treatment based on the particular
attorney-client arrangement. The Ninth Circuit decision begs the ultimate statutory
question so long as it permits higher hourly rates to accomplish the same end as multi-
pliers.
I V. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 2412(b) ON FEE CALCULATION
The Equal Access to Justice Act coupled an unprecedented expansion in the gov-
ernment's liability for attorneys' fees with strict limitations on the availability and calcu-
lation of those fees. Both the expanded liability and the fee restrictions are essential to
the statutory goal of deterring and correcting unreasonable government conduct. 282 At
the same time, however, the EAJA enacted a separate, relatively narrow provision,
Section 2412(h), waiving the government's immunity from the fees to which other
litigants have long been subject. Unlike section 2412(d), section 2412(b) is neither novel
2" The Dubose court stated: "The statute does not specifically provide for a multiplier. I need
not determine, however, if Congress intended to allow such an upward adjustment, because in my
opinion one would not be justified." 579 F. Supp. at 952.
280 Id. The court specifically noted the "uniform success of plaintiffs against HUD across the
country." Id. The court also implicitly rejected the Underwood court's assumption that the risk of
litigation was irrelevant because of the unavailability of fees for prevailing counsel. Id.
2° ' In contrast with Underwood, the Dubose court found that:
Nile performance of counsel in this case, while quite sound, was not so extraordinary
as to justify a multiplier or any higher fee .... Further, the extremely generous
settlement which counsel obtained form HUD — amounting not to a true compromise,
but rather an agreement by HUD to give plaintiffs all that they asked for — must.
have arisen not by reason of plaintiffs' especially skillful bargaining, but by HUD's
realization that the adverse judicial decisions left it with no bargaining chips. Finally,
the settlement administration, even if perfortned quite well, was not primarily work
of a legal nature.
Id. at 952 (emphasis in original). See also Battles Farms Co. v. l'ierce, No. 76-393 (D.D.C. April 25,
1985), another operating subsidy case in which a court denied a multiplier, applying the standard
established in Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
282 See supra notes 146-77 and accompanying text.
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nor visionary. 283 It is intended only to place the United States on the same footing as
any other litigant. In enacting this section, Congress explained that:
Section 2412(b) permits a court in its discretion to award fees and other
expenses to prevailing parties in civil litigation involving the United States
to the same extent it may award fees in cases involving other parties ....
Thus, under this subsection cases involving the United States would be
subject to the "bad faith," "common fund" and "common benefit" exceptions
to the American rule against fee shifting. The United States would also be
liable under the same standards which govern awards against other parties
under Federal statutory exceptions, unless the statute expressly provides
otherwise. This subsection clarifies the liability of the United States under
such statutes as the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, as
we il . 2B4
Since awards under section 2412(b) are governed by the same standards applicable to
any other party, none of the fee limitations in section 2412(d) apply. 285 Any substantial
expansion of section 2412(b) would therefore permit circumvention of the restrictions
in section 2412(d) on the amount of fees.
In the Underwood appeal, plaintiffs argued that section 2412(b) should be read in
conjunction with the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act 286
 to greatly expand its
scope. 287
 Section 1988 of the 1976 act provides fees for parties prevailing under 42
U.S.C. sections 1981-1986, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title 14 of the
Education Amendments of 1972 .288 Section 1983, in turn, provides a statutory right of
action against any person, acting under color of state law, who deprives another person
of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 289 Federal
housing officials violating a federal housing act could not be held liable under section
1983 because they did not act "under color of state law." Nonetheless, Underwood plaintiffs
argued that because a state violating the National Housing Act 290 would be liable under
section 1983 — and therefore for attorneys' fees under section 1988 — HUD should be
288 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982) provides: The United States shall be liable for such fees and
expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable tinder the common law or under
the.terrns of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
284 H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 153, at 17.
285 For example, fees could be awarded even if the government position is substantially justified
and they could be awarded at rates above $75 per hour without special justification.
986 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
287 This argument was not raised in the district court.
2" 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985
and 1986 of this title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
2" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2'9" The Underwood plaintiffs had challenged HUD's refusal to implement the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1974 amendments to the National Housing Act of 1937, then codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750jj (1976).
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held liable for fees to the same extent as a state even though such a violation by HUD
involves no state action and would not be actionable under section 1983.
The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have since rejected such a far-
reaching construction of section 2412(b). In Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, the Ninth
Circuit counseled that "[i]n construing a provision allowing fee awards against the
government, we must take care not to enlarge the waiver of immunity beyond what a
fair reading of the language of the statute requires." 2" The court of appeals then
construed the the phrase allowing fees against the government "to the same extent that
any other party would be liable under the terms of any statute which specifically provides
for such an award" to require that the terms of sections 1983 and 1988 be met. 292 The
court thus concluded that, to recover fees, the prevailing party must satisfy section 1983's
state action requirement. Had Congress intended otherwise, the court opined, it could
have "amended section 2412(b) to make fees allowable in those circumstances where the
court may award fees in analogous suits involving other litigants.'" 2"
In dismissing the Lauritzen plaintiffs' interpretation, the court of appeals paid par-
ticular attention to congressional policy, declaring that:
[t]he balance' struck by Congress would be upset if section 2412(b) were
interpreted to allow fee awards under section 1988 in cases analogous to
section 1983 suits .. . . Nearly every case alleging a constitutional or statutory
violation by the federal government could be characterized as analogous to
an imaginary section 1983 action. This observation applies to cases even in
which it is clear that section 2412(d) is intended to be applicable.29'
2"1 736 F.2d 550, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1984). Accord, Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1152-54
(11th Cir. 1985); Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Since Lauritzen
was decided while the Underwood appeal was pending, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Underwood
plaintiffs' argument for fees under § 2412(6).
292
 736 F.2d at 556. Accord, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
29 ' 736 F.2d at 556 (emphasis added). Accord, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n v.
Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 925-26 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Unification Church v. INS, 574 F. Supp. 93,
96 (D.D.C. 1983); Venus v. Goodman, 556 F. Supp. 514, 521 (W.D. Wis. 1983); United States v.
Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122, 129 (N.D. III. 1982). See also League of
Women Voters V. FCC, No. 79-1562mm1, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1983). One district court observed
that:
Section 1988 changes the American rule only in specific instances and as to Section
1983 (unlike the other statutes Section 1988 incorporates by reference), it does so only
to state actors. No private tortfeasor, even though infringing a plaintiff's rights in
precisely the same way a party acting under color of state law might, is vulnerable
under Section 1983 or thereby under Section 1988. Thus [plaintiff's construction]
would actually render it worse off, at least to the extent that "other parties" are private
citizens.
United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
29-4
 736 F.2d at 557. Accord, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
where the court stated:
Adopting Premachandra's interpretation of section 2412(6) could render nugatory the
"substantially justified" and "special circumstances" limits in section 2412(d)
[W]hen section 2412 was passed, it was conceivable that all federal statutes could
support section 1983 actions .... If so, parties could readily bypass the "substantially
justified" requirement and evade the other substantive limits in subsection (d) under
Premachandra's theory. A plain reading of the statute and its context does not support
Premachandra's position.
Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted). But see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980) (refusing to
limit section 1983 to civil rights violations).
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As the court acknowledged, the effect of such a broad interpretation of section 2412(b)
would be to limit section 2412(d)'s fee restrictions to contract claims and government-
initiated enforcement actions. Congress's careful effort to avoid the excessive cost and
potential chilling effect of unbridled fees would be to no avail.
Finally, in Lauritzen the Ninth Circuit also refused to give "dispositive weight" to the
congressional testimony of Armand Derfner of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under the Law and the American Civil Liberties Union. 2" In order to extend section
1988 to the federal government, Mr. Derfner had proposed amending the original bill
to change the section providing that the United States be liable to the same extent as "a
private party" to read that the United States would be liable "in those circumstances
where the court may award such fees in suits involving other litigants." 29° Congress
adopted the amendment providing for fees "to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the terms of any statute" without explanation. The court ruled
that, particularly in the absence of any evidence that Congress — as opposed to Mr.
Derfner2" — endorsed the Lauritzen plaintiffs' interpretation,298 congressional testimony
could not override "a fair reading of the language of the statute." 2"
20 736 F.2d at 555-56.
296 See 5.265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal
Government, supra note 159, at 1, 3, 9 (setting forth the bill as of August, 1979).
297
 Armand Derfner had testified that:
[t]here is an area in which a slight drafting modification could carry out what I believe
might be the intention of the committee; and that is to put the United States completely
on a par as far as the enforcement of important constitutional and statutory rights.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1976 you provided that when someone, whether it be
an individual or business, or whatever, sues a State or local government under 42
United States Code, section 1983, to vindicate a constitutional or Federal statutory
right, that fees would be available under the Newman v. Pegg [Figgie] Park [sic] standard.
These bills would say that the United States should pay fees — in the amendment to
28 United States Code 2412 — in those circumstances where the court may award
such fees in suits involving private parties.
That doesn't say State or local government, but if the language were amended to
read, in those circumstances where the court may award such fees in suits involving
other litigants; it would achieve that purpose. And 1 think it would go even further
toward putting the United States on a par with other governmental bodies.
Hearings: Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government, supra note 150, at 100. In fact,
however, the language Congress adopted provided that the United States be liable to the same
extent as "any other party," language subject to a different interpretation. See Premachandra v.
Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
298 An alternative reason for the amendment could have been to extend § 1988 liability to
federal officials in those suits where the federal officials have been held liable for violations of title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title 14 of the Education Amendments of 1972, or for acting in
concert with state officials violating § 1983. See Shannon v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978) (holding that sovereign immunity
barred fees against the United States in title VI or title IX cases and that § 1988 did not waive that
immunity). See also NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (claims under §§ 1981 and
1985). Both titles apply to acts of discrimination "under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (title VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (title IX). Title VI and title
IX and § 1983 are directed primarily at public entities. If § 24 i2(b) had retained the reference to
"private parties," coverage under those provisions would have been questionable. See Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
2" Lauritzen, 736 F.2d' at 555-56. Accord, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 640 (8th Cir.
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Although the courts initially split in their construction of section 2412(b), 50° the
weight of authority now rests with the Lauritzen position."' The most compelling reason
is Congress's careful balance between fee expansion and fee restrictions."" Congress
intended section 2412(d), not section 2412(b), to provide the major extension of federal
fee liability. Congress had already authorized fees to encourage enforcement of federal
civil rights laws and selected other federal statutes. 403 There is no indication in the
legislative history of a congressional effort to equate federal misapplication of federal
law with state violations of civil rights. 314 Rather, the legislative history is replete with
references to the need to restrain federal regulation through the careful balance of fee
incentives and restrictions in section 2412(d). 305 Adoption of an expansive interpretation
1985) (en bane). See also United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122
(N.D. Ill. 1982), in which the court stated: -
It may well be that the change was motivated by a desire to expose the federal
government to the same liability for a constitutional infringement (although obviously
not cognizable under Section 1983) as a state government sued for the same violation
under that section. But if so, Derfner was a better policy advocate than a draftsman.
Such a limited revision of the language in Section 2412(b), without any explicit directive
in the statute or any change in the clear thrust of Section 1988 cannot override the
plain meaning of the latter provision. Arguable congressional intent must give way to
unambiguous congressional language.
Id. at 129. See also Unification Church v. INS, 574 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D.D.C. 1983) ("To conclude
that Congress intended to subject the United States to an award of attorneys' fees in any case in
which federal officials are found to have misapplied federal law because states officials would be
liable had they done the same thing would entail a pure implication of legislative intent which
Congress was fully capable of expressing had it so meant to do."); Venus v. Goodman, 556 F. Supp.
514, 521-22 (D. Wis. 1983) ("Where the statutory language and its implications are clear, the court
will not delve into the legislative history.")
3°° The initial district court and Eighth Circuit panel decision in Premachandra v. Mitts, 548 F.
Supp. 17 (E.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 727 F.2d 717, 726 (8th Cir. 1984), and the district court decision
in Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F. Supp. 1221, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1982), have been reversed.
See Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985); Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550 (5th
Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit appears to have accepted an expansive interpretation of § 2412(b)
in dictum, relying on the now vacated Premachandra and Lauritzen opinions. See Boudin v..Thomas,
732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984). This leaves Trujillo v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (D.
Colo. 1984), in support of the expansive interpretation.
3° ' In addition to Premachandra and Lauritzen, see Holbrook v. Pitt, 748 F.2d 1168, 1176-77
(7th Cir. 1984); Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The plaintiffs' claims here,
they argue, are virtually identical to the usual section 1983 action so that attorneys' fees should be
allowed under color of federal as well as state law. That argument deserves credit for originality,
but it is too original."); see also supra note 299, infra note 305 and cases cited therein.
3" See supra note 294.
3°3 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1982) (especially titles IV,
VI and VIII).
301 Section 1983, after all, was adopted in 1871 to implement the mandate in the three year
old fourteenth amendment "to place a restraint on the action of the states." United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 638 (1882). Section 1983 is the major civil rights law dealing with state actions, and
state compliance with federal law is central to the act. A separate — and extensive — body of federal
law governs civil rights violations by federal officials, with provisions for attorneys' fees. See supra
note 303. Moreover, federal violations of federal law, particularly administrative agency misappli-
cation of the laws that they are charged with administering, is a very different matter from state
violations of federal law actionable under § 1983. The former involves enforcement of the suprem-
acy clause; the latter does not. Indeed, in the Underwood case, it is difficult to imagine a state
violation of the National Housing Act.
305 Indeed, an expansive interpretation of § 2412(b) would circumvent not only the limitations
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of section 2412(b) would not change the law governing liability nor extend fee availability
to many cases not covered by section 2412(d)." Instead, such a construction would
encourage wholesale circumvention of the Act's fee limitations, undercutting the careful
balance at the heart of the EAJA.
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATION
The early indications are that the courts, in calculating fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, are once again applying traditional doctrine to a newly authorized award.
Only later will the courts adjust the rules to undo the inconsistencies.
At the time the EAJA was passed, "traditional doctrine" consisted of the lodestar/
multiplier formula, developed to curb the excesses of common fund awards, adapted to
aid the expansion of civil rights fees, and under appellate review to restrain the con-
tinuing multiplication of legal expenses. Traditional doctrine, however, in any of its
many guises, is not well suited for EAJA fee calculation. The new statute enacted a
legislative compromise balancing fee incentives for those wronged by government mis-
conduct against the exposure of the United States Treasury and the potential chilling
effect on federal action. Reflecting that balance, the Act specified that fees be set in
accordance with prevailing market rates irrespective of the particular attorney-client
arrangement, that fees be limited to $75 per hour, unless "a special factor, such as the
limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee," and that fees be limited to the most egregious cases, in essence, those in which the
government position was not "substantially justified.""
Despite these statutory limitations, in Underwood v. Pierce, a federal district court
awarded hourly rates of $120 per hour with a multiplier of 3.5 in an unthinking
application of the Ninth Circuit's open-ended rules of fee calculation." In the Underwood
appeal, the court prohibited multipliers in EAJA cases on statutory grounds, yet at the
same time endorsed wholesale incorporation of traditional fee calculation factors into
the EAJA. The D.C. Circuit in A.S.H., which acknowledged the narrow purpose of the
statutory exception providing for higher fees, nevertheless permitted the wholesale
incorporation of that circuit's fee standards into the EAJA." Even in the carefully
crafted Dubose decision, a Connecticut federal district court applied the statutory provi-
sions more in accordance with the rigor required by the Second Circuit than with an
overriding vision of the EAJA's particular purposes and concerns."°
on the amount of fees in § 2412(d), but the provision that fees are limited to cases in which the
government position is not "substantially justified." Under § 1988, fees would be available to almost
every prevailing party. The most persuasive counterargumcnt is the Derfner testimony, viz., the
elimination of anomalies such as the immunization of federal defendants jointly found liable with
state officials under § 1983 for actions no private party could commit. See United States v. Miscel-
laneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122, 128 (N.D. 111. 1982); supra note 298. Moreover,
as the Lauritzen and Premachandra courts have emphasized congressional testimony by itself carries
little weight. Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Lauritzen v.
Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 555 (1984). See also supra notes 297-99.
506
 For example, the United States could still not be held liable under § 1983 absent state action.
It could only be held liable for fees in those cases where substantive liability was established under
another provision.
5°/ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d) (1982). See supra notes 146-77 and accompanying text.
5°8 See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
500 See Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
310 The court, for example, concluded that no multiplier was justified, that reconstructed
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As EAJA fees mount, the courts are at a watershed: either they will reverse the
wholesale application of existing fee guidelines to EAJA decisions, requiring a separate
line of analysis consistent with the statute's distinctive provisions, or they will incorporate
EAJA decisions into the mainstream of traditional fee doctrine. If the courts choose the
former course, they will refine the Act's economic calculus, limiting fees to those activities
necessary for adversarial representation, defining exceptions to the Act's $75 per hour
limit in terms of the market rates necessary to secure competent counsel, and awarding
only higher prevailing rates, not bonuses for quality or contingency.
If the courts choose the latter course, the reasoning may bear no relation to the
EAJA's peculiar concerns but the results may ultimately be similar. In guiding non-EAJA
fees, the Supreme Court has reversed judgment on the propriety of contingency bonuses
in statutory awards.'" l If it decides the issue in the context of an EAJA case, it may well
prohibit such bonuses altogether or restrict them to situations where it would be other-
wise difficult to secure competent representation. Similarly, the Court has already re-
stricted quality increases to "the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence
that the quality of service was superior . . . and that the success was exceptional." 312 If the
standard for quality increases becomes the standard for exceptions to the EAJA's $75
per hour limit, the Court may well emphasize the limited nature of the quality increase
and the heavy burden on the fee applicant to justify such an increase. The courts are
already undertaking closer scrutiny of compensable activities, reconstructed records,
estimated hourly rates and multipliers." If EAJA cases decided under specific statutory
provisions requiring such scrutiny contribute to the general body of attorneys' fee
decisions, they may well accelerate the conservative trend."
The time is long overdue, however, for the courts to accept that attorney fee
calculation is an issue of statutory construction. The Equal Access to Justice Act, more
than any previous fee shifting statute, depends on fee calculations as well as fee avail-
ability to accomplish its objectives. The Act specifies the manner of calculation and the
amount of the fees to be awarded. Its legislative history articulates priorities which
require that fees be set in ways which depart from traditional doctrine. EAJA awards
should not reflect the remedial purposes of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act.
Nor should conservatively calculated EAJA awards restrict the fees available to plaintiffs
prevailing in antitrust class actions. The time has come for the courts to focus renewed
attention on the relationship between fee calculation and the purposes each award was
intended to serve.
records should be penalized, and that settlement administration should not be compensated under
traditional fee doctrine. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
3 " See Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984); supra note 141.
9'2 Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added).
912 See supra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
"4 Of course, even if the courts affirm the need for independent calculation of EAJA awards,
those awards may influence non-EAJA calculations. The anomalies underlying application of con-
tingency increases in EAJA cases afflict other statutory awards. The calculation of lodestar adjust-
ments in terms of higher hourly rates could influence determination of such adjustments in other
types of awards. insistence on an economic rationale for exceptions to the $75 per hour limit could
determine the calculation of multipliers generally. Even acceptance of the $75 per hour limit could
set a new standard of "reasonable fees."
